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I. INTRODUCTION
“Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.”1
Presidents cancel or modify executive orders and proclamations
issued by prior Presidents all the time.2 What is not so clear is whether
this presidential discretion applies to orders or proclamations issued at
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center where she teaches natural
resources law among other courses and directs an environmental law clinic. She
thanks the Law Center for its continuing generous support for her scholarship,
without which this article might not have been possible and for the ongoing
technical, proofreading, and moral support from her clinic’s office manager, Niko
Perazich.
1
THE FEDERALIST No.10, at 57 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
2
For example, on March 27, 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order
titled “Revocation of Federal Contracting Executive Orders” rescinding the
Executive Orders issued by President Obama (Exec. Order No. 13,673 of July 31,
2014, Exec. Order No. 13,738 of August 23, 2016, and Exec. Order 13,683, § 3, of
December 11, 2014). Exec. Order No. 13,782, 82 Fed. Reg. 15,607 (Mary 27,
2017).
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the direction of Congress, as is the case with national monuments
designated by presidential proclamation under the authority of the
Antiquities Act.3 Section 431 of that Act authorizes the President to
declare by public proclamation “historic landmarks, historic and
prehistoric structures and other object of historic or scientific interest”
on public land and to reserve sufficient public land to properly care for
and manage the protected objects.4 While over the law’s 111 years,
disgruntled states, interest groups, and individuals have challenged some
of these proclamations, no President has ever rescinded a designation
made by a prior President, let alone even threatened it, until President
Trump proposed doing so this year.5
This Article suggest that the fact that Congress has placed its
imprimatur on the designation process shields it from whimsical actions
by later Presidents seeking to rescind or shrink the size of previously
designated national monuments.6 To conclude otherwise would
3

54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2014). See Roberto Iraola, Proclamations, National
Monuments, and the Scope of Judicial Review Under the Antiquities Act of 1906,
29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 159, 164-65 (2004) (“Whether the
President may modify the size of a monument remains more of an open question in
academic circles.”).
4
54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2014).
5
President Trump issued an executive order, “Review of Designations under the
Antiquities Act,” directing the Secretary of Interior to review monument
designations made since 1996 that reserve over 100,000 acres “where the Secretary
determines that the designation or expansion was made without adequate public
outreach and coordination with relevant stakeholders.” Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82
Fed. Reg. 20, 429 (Apr. 26, 2017). The Secretary is to write a report making
recommendations for Presidential action, legislative proposals, or other action
consistent with law as the Secretary may consider appropriate to carry out the
policy” set out in the order. Mark Squillace, Eric Biber, Nicholas S. Bryner, Sean
B. Hecht, Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish National
Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 55 n.2 (June 2017),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/presidents-lack-authorityabolish-or-diminish-national-monuments. See Jennifer Yachnin, Zinke could target
any site he deems lacked ‘outreach,’ E&E NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017),
http://eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060053645/print (listing twenty-four national
monuments under review by Secretary Zinke).
6
Although some prior Presidents, especially during the early period of the Act’s
implementation, reduced the size of previously designated monuments, including
some large reductions like President Wilson halving the size of Mount Olympus
National Monument established by President Teddy Roosevelt, these actions have
never been reviewed by a court, let alone had their validity determined by a court.
Additionally, all these actions occurred before the enactment of section 704(j) of

CONVERTDOC.INPUT.593072.DSQ9K (DO NOT DELETE)

104

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

1/17/2018 10:44 PM

[Vol. 37:1

contradict the plain language of the statute, which would give Congress
plenary power over the designation process and would aggregate to the
President powers he does not have, thus creating separation of powers
concerns. Nor can Presidents simply elect not to enforce a law because it
is not to their liking. Allowing Presidents to revoke prior monument
designations would create substantial uncertainty about the legal force
and effects of such proclamations once made. This uncertainty, in turn,
would affect expectations about how the designated land should be
managed and inhibit future designations. It would also adversely affect
local economic growth and regional adjustments in response to
designations.
The article develops these observations in the following manner.
Part II briefly sets out the legislative and judicial history of the
Antiquities Act, its original purpose, its use over the years, and judicial
decisions interpreting its text. This part also discusses prior attempts by
Presidents to revoke or modify earlier designations. Part III
contextualizes the current debate over the statute by examining the local
controversy surrounding President Obama’s designation of the Bears
Ears National Monument in Utah. Part III tries to understand whether
the animosity towards national monuments, as exemplified by the
opposition to Bears Ears designation and before that to President
Clinton’s designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument, is the last vestige of strong anti-federal government feelings
in the Intermountain West.7 Such feelings may be weakening as the
the Federal Land Policy & Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(j), preventing the
Secretary of Interior from modifying or revoking any reservation of land creating a
national monument under the Antiquities Act. See Squillace et al., supra note 5, at
65. Presidents Taft and Eisenhower also reduced the boundaries of pre-existing
monument and President Wilson added 900,000 acres to the system. Juliet Elperin,
Trump to ask for review of national monuments, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 25,
2017, at A3; see also Squillace et al, supra note 5, at 66-68 (discussing, more
generally, the lack of Presidential authority to shrink national monuments,
including various Solicitor Opinions issued by the Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior in 1924, 1932, and 1935 on the topic of the President’s lack of authority
to do so).
7
That these anti-government sentiments are not only a western phenomenon is
brought home by local opposition to President Obama’s 2016 designation of
Katahdin Woods and Waters National Monument (North Woods National
Monument) in Maine, protecting 87,500 acres. Governor Paul LePage testified
before the House Natural Resources Committee against the designation in April
2017 and has asked President Trump to reverse the order creating the monument,
saying that the designation will “undermine the forest products industry by limiting
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area’s population changes from one that engages in traditional western
industries, like ranching and mining, to one that relies on recreation and
tourism.
Part III also sets out three over-arching criticisms of the statute,
which have become manifest during the recent debates over the
designation of Bear Ears National Monument in, namely that (1) the Act
usurps congressional power, (2) the Act is undemocratic because neither
the public nor any popularly elected legislator participates in the
designation process, and (3) designations under the Act adversely affect
the cultural salience and economic well-being of local communities. The
Part includes a rejoinder to each of those arguments, including the
results of recent reports showing that monument designations create
positive economic and social impacts on host communities.
Part IV argues that Presidents have neither direct nor implied power
to rescind or adjust the boundaries of previously designated national
monuments. The part shows that the text of the Act unambiguously
prohibits the President from changing in any way a prior President’s
designation of a national monument, reserving that power to Congress.
Interpretive canons and other explanatory tropes are either irrelevant or
confirm a limited view of the President’s authority. Part V show how
any contrary view of the President’s authority under the Antiquities Act
would violate the separation of powers doctrine and run counter to wellestablished norms governing the exercise of delegated power by
Presidents. While Presidents retain some discretion to tinker with laws
that require minor adjustments to respond to changed circumstances,
Part V shows how the Take Care Clause prohibits a President from
categorically waiving provisions of a law he does not like or with whose
underlying policy he disagrees.
The article concludes by observing that allowing a President to
revoke or alter the boundaries of a designated national monument, as
President Trump is proposing to do with Bears Ears and several other
monuments, would undermine the purpose of a 111-year old law and
abolish an act of Congress by Presidential fiat. It may also invite public
anger and reprisal, especially if the action is perceived as illegitimate.
II. THE TEXT OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT, ITS LEGISLATIVE AND
timber harvest.” Maine Governor to testify against Katahdin Woods designation,
GREENWIRE (April 25, 2017),
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060053544/print. Maine’s congressional
delegation supports the designation. Id.
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IMPLEMENTATION HISTORY, AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
In the realm of historic and natural preservation on the nation’s
public lands, no law has ever approached the scope of the 1906
Antiquities Act.8
Section 431 of the Antiquities Act authorizes the President of the
United States to protect by proclamation “historic landmarks, historic
and prehistoric structures and other objects of historic or scientific
interest” located on federal lands. The section also authorizes the
President to reserve “parcels of land” of a size sufficient to allow for the
proper care and management of the protected objects. Originally
intended to protect ruins in the Southwest, Presidents have used the
section to protect large areas of land, in which objects of historical and
scientific interest are housed—so-called landscape designations. Today
there are 170 national monuments, thirteen of which have been
designated by Congress, including monuments that protect marine
resources.9 They range in size from 1,700,000 acres (Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument in Arizona) to 0.01 acres (Father Millett
Cross in New York).10 Only three Presidents since the passage of the
Act in 1906, Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush did not
designate any monuments.11
Devils Tower, in Wyoming, is “America’s first national
8

Richard West Sellars, A Very Large Array: Early Federal Historic Preservation The Antiquities Act, Mesa Verde, and the National Park Service Act, 47 NAT.
RESOURCES. J. 267, 293 (2007). See also John D. Leshy & Mark Squillace, The
Endangered Antiquities Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2017, at A23 (“a good argument
can be made that this brief law . . . has done more than any other to shape our
nation’s conservation legacy.”); see also id. (“Five of the nation’s 10 most-visited
national parks—Grand Canyon, Zion, Olympic, Teton, and Acadia, each attracting
millions of people a year—were first protected by presidents using the Antiquities
Act.”).
9
Tatiana Schlossberg, What is the Antiquities Act, and Why Does the President
Want to Change It, N.Y. TIMES, Ap. 27, 2017, at A15. See Matthew J. Sanders, Are
National Monuments the Right Way to Manage Federal Public Lands?, 31 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVT. 3, 4 (2017) (saying there are 147 national monuments); Leshy
& Squillace, supra note 8, at A23 (pegging the number at 150).
10
Sanjay Ranchod, The Clinton National Monuments: Protecting Ecosystems with
the Antiquities Act, 25 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. app. A at 585-87 (2001). President
Coolidge who established the Father Millet Cross National Monument, also
designated the Statue of Liberty, protecting 2.50 acres; he was capable of creating
large monuments, setting aside 1,164,800 acres for Glacier Bay National
Monument in Alaska. Id.
11
Elperin, supra note 6, at A3.
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monument.12 Currently, there are national monuments in thirty-one
states.13 “The number of national monuments designated by each
President has varied wildly, from one each for Presidents Truman and
Johnson to nineteen each for Presidents Clinton and Obama.”14 Of landbased national monuments, President Carter designated the largest
combined area, nearly 56 million acres, mostly in Alaska. President
George W. Bush designated more than 147 million acres of marine
national monuments. President Obama surpassed both Presidents Bush
and Clinton by protecting 265 million acres, mostly by enlarging
President Bush’s network of marine national monuments. 15 The last
three Presidents have designated nearly a third of the national
monuments created up until the present, “and they are responsible for an
even higher percentage of the total number of acres included within
national monuments over time.”16 Only Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and
George H.W. Bush failed to use their power under the Antiquities Act to
designate any national monument.17
Most of this has happened by Presidential fiat, often late in their
Administrations with little correction by the courts or Congress. 18 The
section’s legislative history is sparse and sheds little light on key terms,
like what constitutes an object of historic or scientific interest or what is
“the smallest area” that a President may reserve to assure the proper care
and management of the designated objects.19 Attempts by Presidents and
Congress to revoke or modify previously designated monuments have
come to naught, creating an inference that at least up until now, the Act
has been working as it was intended to.
12

Sellars, supra note 8, at 294; see also Arnold & Porter, Kaye Scholer, The
President Has No Power Unilaterally to Abolish a National Monument under the
Antiquities Act of 1906 (Feb. 8, 2017), 2 (in possession of author) (“President
Theodore Roosevelt was the first to use that Act, establishing 18 National
Monuments, including Devil’s Tower, Muir Woods and the Grand Canyon.”).
13
Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 9.
14
Id. at 4.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Elperin, supra note 6, at A3; see also Albert Lin, Clinton’s National Monuments:
A Democrat’s Undemocratic Acts?, 29 ECOLOGY L. Q 707, 714 (2002), but he
mistakenly says President George W. Bush did not designate any monuments.
18
Leshy & Squillace, supra note 8, at A23 (citing President Theodore Roosevelt’s
protection of the “core” of what today is Olympic National Park two days before he
left office or President Eisenhower’s protection of what became the Chesapeake
and Ohio National Historical Park two days before Kennedy’s inauguration).
19
See infra at Part II.B (discussing the statute’s legislative history).
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A. The Antiquities Act and the process for designating a National
Monument.
Section 431 of the Antiquities Act reads as follows:
The President of the United States is authorized, in his discretion, to
declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and
prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest
that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the
Government of the United States to be national monuments, and may
reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases
shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care
and management of the objects to be protected. When such objects are
situated upon a tract covered a bona fide unperfected claim or held in
private ownership, the tract, or so much thereof as may be necessary
for the proper care and management of the object, may be relinquished
to the Government, and the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to
accept the relinquishment of such tracts in behalf of the Government of
the United States.20

In 155 words, section 431 of the Antiquities Act sets out a process
for the President of the United States to identify and protect “historic
and prehistoric structures and other objects of historic or scientific
interest” on federal lands and simultaneously reserve sufficient lands for
their “proper care and management.”
This is not done by executive order, the usual tool that the President
uses to announce some policy or action, but by proclamation.21
However, that the President proceeds by proclamation rather than
executive order to designate national monuments has no relevance to the
question whether the President has the power to rescind or otherwise
amend a monument designation.22 But, the fact that presidential
proclamations designating national monuments are issued under the
authority of the Antiquities Act gives them more than the usual hortatory

20

16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000).
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS
AND PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, at vii (Comm.
Print 1957).
22
PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20647, AUTHORITY OF A
PRESIDENT TO MODIFY OR ELIMINATE A NATIONAL MONUMENT, at 1 n.7 (2000)
(One congressional study noted that executive orders relate to intra-executive
branch actions, while “a proclamation typically affects citizens” more broadly.).
21
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power with respect to the general public.23
There is no requirement for public notice of any designation either
before or after the fact, and no opportunity for comment or any other
form of participation by the public or its elected representatives in the
designation process.24 While the statute “authorizes” the President to set
aside land, it does not “require” that he do this.25 But once the land is
reserved, the designated monument becomes the dominant use of that
land in the face of competing land uses, and the land management
agencies must manage “the objects” and reserved lands as necessary to
fulfill the purposes of the designation proclamation.26
Site examination and excavation on monument grounds as well as
removal and collection of objects is controlled through a permitting
system that restricts these activities to qualified representatives of
museums, universities or other recognized educational institutions,
where the removed objects are to be permanently curated.27 The Act
criminalizes disturbing protected sites without a permit and imposes
fines and penalties on those who violate the law.28
The Department of Interior, or occasionally the Department of
Agriculture if the future monument is on national forest lands, generates
a proposal to create a new national monument, sometimes at the
suggestion of a grassroots coalition, sometimes at the suggestion of a

23

PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20647, AUTHORITY OF A
PRESIDENT TO MODIFY OR ELIMINATE A NATIONAL MONUMENT, at 1 n.7 (2000)
(“the President's proclamations are at best hortatory so far as the general public is
concerned unless they are based on statutory or Constitutional authority."), citing
Executive Orders and Proclamations: A Study of a Use of Presidential Powers,
Committee on Government Operations, 85th Congress, 1st Sess. at vii (Dec.
1957).”).
24
Iraola, supra note 3, at 163 (“The plain language of the Act confers upon the
President the authority to designate national monuments without public
participation, congressional review, or any other procedural prerequisite.”); see also
David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive to
Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279, 300 (1982) ("The Antiquities Act
gave the President authority to withdraw lands with no limits on duration,
unhindered by any procedural requirements, with no provision for congressional
review, and with no fixed acreage limitation.").
25
Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA.
L. REV. 473, 514 (2003).
26
Id. at 515-16.
27
16 U.S.C. § 433 (1906); see Sellars, supra note 8, at 294.
28
16 U.S.C. Preamble (1906); see Sellars, supra note 8, at 294.
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member of Congress.29 In more recent times, like with the Bears Ears
designation, there are stakeholder meetings with federal and local
officials and local communities,30 even though the Act does not require
this step. Generally the relevant land management agency, i.e. the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the National Park Service (NPS),
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in the Department of the Interior,
or the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture, drafts the
Presidential proclamation and assembles supporting background
information and maps for the President’s review.31
The last step in the process calls upon the Council on Environmental
Quality to review the proposal and make a recommendation to the
President about whether the monument should be designated. If the
President accepts the recommendation to designate the monument, he
issues a proclamation to that effect.32 The President can change the
proposed size of the monument, add or remove conditions on use of the
land within the monument’s boundaries, and otherwise revise the
recommendation—after all, the designation is his.
The proclamation goes into effect when it is published in the Federal
Register, usually within a week of presidential issuance.33 The
proclamation is not issued for public comment, nor is there any other
federal, state, local or tribal agency involvement in the designation
process.
Section 431 contains no guidance on the meaning of its key terms.
For example, the statute is silent as to what qualifies as a structure or
object of scientific interest to warrant protection or the amount of land
Sanders, supra note 9, at 4 (”The most successful proposals are often those that
begin as legislation but fail to receive sufficient traction, such as President Obama’s
three most recent national monuments (originally the subject of conservation bills
sponsored by Senator Dianne Feinstein).”).
30
Id.; see also Elperin, supra note 6, at A3 (reporting on Interior Secretary Sally
Jewell’s “lengthy public hearing”).
31
Exec. Order No. 11,030, 1 C.F.R. § 19.2, reprinted as amended in 44 U.S.C.
§ 1505 (2015) (identifying “the Director of Office of Management and Budget as
the person responsible for” the routing and approval of drafts); see also Sanders,
supra note 9, at 4; Iraola, supra note 3, at 167 n.30 (explaining in detail this
process).
32
Sanders, supra note 9, at 4.
33
Id. “In 1936, Congress passed the Federal Register Act, legislation requiring
executive orders and presidential proclamations ‘of general applicability and legal
effect’ to be published in the Federal Register unless the President concludes
otherwise on account of national security or other specified reasons.” Iraola, supra
note 3, at 166.
29
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sufficient for their protection. Nor does the section’s legislative history
shed much light on those terms. Their meaning becomes apparent only
through their application under the watchful eyes of the courts and
Congress. Like section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy
Act,34 another famously short and controversial statutory provision, the
meaning of section 431 has been made clear over time by the courts,
although with many fewer decisions than those interpreting NEPA,
which has not made its use any less controversial.
B. Legislative History of the Act
1. Enactment.35
In 1889, Congress signed an Act to repair and protect Casa Grande,
a large, multi-level earthen structure in south-central Arizona Territory
and directed the President to “reserve [the site] from settlement and
sale.”36 The Act also authorized the President “to include in the reserve
as much of the adjacent public lands ‘as in his judgment may be
necessary’ for protecting the major structure and its associated
village.”37 President Benjamin Harrison’s issuance of an executive order
in 1892, that created a 480-acre reservation in accordance with the Act,
marked the beginning of federal conservation of historic structures in the
southwest.38 However, this was a one-time only authorization and did
not grant the President broad powers to protect other historic or
archaeological sites on public lands.39
Prior to passage of the act protecting and repairing Casa Grande,
Congress had passed the Forest Reserve Act, which authorized
Presidents “to establish forest reserves on public lands by
34

42 U.S.C. § 4332.
See generally Squillace, supra note 25, at 476-86 (discussing the Antiquities
Act’s legislative history); Sellars, supra note 8, at 267 (giving thorough discussions
of the enactment legislative history of the 1906 Antiquities Act).
36
Sellars, supra note 8, at 275. Sellars also notes that “[a] small group centered in
Boston and including such prominent figures as jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes,
historian Francis Parkman, and poet John Greenleaf Whittier,” petitioned Congress
to preserve the area, which may have helped secure the Act’s passage. Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 275-76.
39
Id. at 276 (noting that “[t]his one-at-a-time approach suggested that the
preservation community, which included Interior Department officials, especially
in the General Land Office, could well face lengthy legislative struggles in seeking
to set aside permanently other important sites.”).
35
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proclamation.”40 Presidents used the law “aggressively,” setting aside
approximately 151 million acres by 1907.41 Reacting to this Presidential
exuberance, in that same year, Congress rescinded the President’s
authority to set aside forest reserves in several states with a lot of
public lands and also curtailed the use of proclamations by Presidents. 42
Feeling stymied by Congress’ nervousness about excessive
withdrawals of national forest lands, yet worried about vandalism and
looting at sites of archaeological importance, and only having as a model
for congressional action the piecemeal, single site at a time approach of
the Casa Grande law, the Department of Interior’s General Land Office
in the 1890s, on its own, began to withdraw from “sale or other
disposition” lands containing valuable archaeological and natural sites.43
Examples of such withdrawals include Chaco Canyon, in New Mexico,
Mesa Verde, in Colorado, the Petrified Forest, in the Arizona Territory,
and Devils Tower, in Wyoming.44
In 1890, an early version of the Antiquities Act was introduced in
Congress. It included all the elements that would appear in the 1906 law
as well as the principal elements of the 1916 National Park Services
Act.45 “Much more broadly than with individual national park enabling
legislation, the Act made explicit that preservation of historic,
archeological, and other scientific sites on lands controlled by the
federal government was indeed a federal responsibility.”46 However, the
bill was a compromise: it included not just historic landmarks and
structures, but also “other objects of historic or scientific interest,” while
at the same time it required the President to limit the size of monuments
“to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management
of the protected objects.”47 The ways in which the law was crafted to
40

Sellars, supra note 8, at 276. The Forest Reserve Act was codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 471 et seq. (1897).
41
Sellars, supra note 8, at 276.
42
Id. at 276-77.
43
Id. at 279.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 281-82. This bill, H.R. 11021, 58th Cong. § 1 (1900), “would have
authorized the president to ‘[s]et apart and reserve tracts of public land, which for
their scenic beauty, natural wonders or curiosities, ancient ruins or relics, or other
objects of scientific or historical interest, or springs of medicinal properties it is
desirable to protect and utilize in the interest of the public.” Sanders, supra note 9,
at 4.
46
Sellars, supra note 8, at 295.
47
Sanders, supra note 9, at 4.
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resolve conflicting views of the Act’s scope and purpose are set forth
below.
During the crafting of the Antiquities Act, the extent of land to be
reserved to protect a designated object was controversial.48
An open discussion about size occurred on June 5, 1906 just before the
bill passed the House of Representatives. Congressman John Stephens
of Texas, apprehensive that too much public land would be, as he
stated, “locked up” by the Act, asked Congressman John Lacey if the
antiquities bill would, like the Forest Reserves Act, keep large tracts of
public land under permanent federal control. Essentially avoiding the
question, Lacey replied, “Certainly not. The object is entirely different.
It is to preserve these old objects of special interest and the Indian
remains in the pueblos in the Southwest.49

“The final version of the bill [Rep. Hewett’s bill] established a
middle ground between the ‘postage stamp’ archaeological sites favored
by western legislators, and the large scale reservations that could be
designated solely for their scenic beauty, as was favored by the
Department of Interior” by avoiding setting any acreage limit at all.50
Also at issue was what could be considered “objects of scientific
interest.” In an unpublished opinion in a challenge to President Carter’s
designation of various Alaska monuments the District Court for Alaska,
in the only judicial opinion that actually looked at the legislative history
of the Antiquities Act, reviewed various bills pending in Congress while
the Antiquities Act was being considered. This review included a
proposal by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts to protect
only “historic and prehistoric ruins, monuments, archaeological objects,
and antiquities on the public lands.” However, the court, “[n]oting the
broader language that Congress ultimately approved, concluded that the
48

Sellars, supra note 8, at 295.
Id. at 295-96.
50
Squillace, supra note 25, at 485; see also id. at 484 (“There was very little debate
over Hewett's bill, and thus Congress's understanding of what Hewett intended is
not entirely clear. Those commentators who claim that Hewett's proposed
legislation was designed to encompass only small tracts of public lands frequently
cite a colloquy between Congressman Lacey and Congressman John H. Stephens of
Texas. The House Report on the legislation further seems to support a narrow
reading of the law. But the compromise language proposed by Hewett does not
reflect an intent to limit the President's authority as Lacey and others may have
assumed. On the contrary . . . Hewett . . . had specifically avoid the acreage limits
of the earlier bills.”).
49
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phrase ‘objects of historically scientific interest . . . , was indeed
intended to enlarge the authority of the President.’”51
When Congress enacted the Antiquities Act, there were no other
laws that “specifically authorized the President to set aside lands for
preservation purposes,” other than the Yellowstone National Park Act,
which reserved and withdrew approximately two million acres in
Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho “as a pleasuring ground for the benefit
and enjoyment of the people.”52 The Forest Reserves Act of 1891, which
authorized Presidents to set aside and protect forests on public lands
from among other things entry by homesteaders, did not protect them
from mining53 While the Antiquities Act was “not necessarily designed
as a vehicle for public land preservation, it has carried much of that
burden for many years, and it has performed remarkably well in that
role, perhaps because the chief executive is in the best position to give
voice to national preservation goals.”54
This quick review of the legislative history of the Antiquities Act
shows that it was a product of compromise between those who had a
narrow purpose in mind—the protection of historical artifacts—and
those with something grander in mind—the protection of large beautiful
areas. Also unresolved in the text and unexplained in the legislative
history was the amount of land necessary to protect whatever it was that
was to be protected. Concerns about under-protecting and overprotecting, which animated the bill’s drafting and passage, continue to
this day.
2. Prior attempts to repeal or amend the Antiquities Act.
At various points in the 111-year history of the Antiquities Act,
legislation has been introduced to repeal or amend the law, usually in
reaction to a Presidential designation. For example, in 1943, several bills
were introduced to repeal or alternatively amend section 431 of the Act
in response to President Roosevelt’s establishment of the Jackson Hole
National Monument in Wyoming.55 None of these bills passed
51

Id. at 485 (citing Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrews, 14 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1853 (D. Alaska 1980)).
52
Yellowstone Park Act, 16 U.S.C. § 21 (2015). Squillace, supra note 25, at 487.
53
Squillace, supra note 25, at 487.
54
Id. at 488.
55
Justin James Quigley, Grand Staircase-Escalante Nation Monument:
Preservation or Politics?, 19 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 55, 84 (1999)
(“Wyoming Representative Frank A. Barrett introduced House Bill 2591211 and
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Congress.56 Again, in 1976, in response to President Carter’s “creation
of seventeen national monuments encompassing 56 million acres in
Alaska,” Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska introduced a bill to amend the
Act that would have limited its scope to specific types of historic or
prehistoric specimens or structures, such as pottery, dwellings, rock
paintings, carvings, graves, and paleontological specimens “when found
in an archaeological context.”57 To warrant protection, those objects had
to be “directly associated with human behavior and activities.”58 Senator
Gravel’s bill also provided that any reservation that exceeded 5,000
acres required congressional approval within sixty days to become
effective.59 It also did not pass.60
Then, in September 1996, the day after President Clinton designated
the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, Representative
Hansen of Utah introduced House Bill 4118 to amend the Antiquities
Act by requiring that any national monument in excess of 5,000 acres
could only be designated by act of Congress with the concurrence of the
affected state’s governor and state legislature.61 A week later,
Representative William Orton of Utah introduced a bill “to require that
any national monument designated by proclamation be approved by
Congress within 180 days.” Later that same month, Senator Frank
Murkowski of Alaska introduced Senate Bill 2150, requiring
congressional approval of any extension or establishment of a national
monument and that the designations fully comply with NEPA and the
Endangered Species Act.62 In February, Senator Bennett introduced a
bill, the “sole purpose” of which was “to codify the promises . . .
Senator Edward V. Robertson, also from Wyoming, introduced Senate Bill
1056212 which proposed to amend the Antiquities Act by rescinding the
President’s power to establish national monuments and vest such power in
Congress. Furthermore, to repeal section 2 of the Antiquities Act, Colorado
Representative J. Edgar Chenoweth introduced House Bill 388423 and Wyoming
Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney introduced Senate Bill 1046.”). None of these bills
was enacted. Id.
56
Id. at 84.
57
Id. at 84-85.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 85.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 93.
62
Id. “In an apparent attempt to protect California from suffering a similar fate as
Utah, on January 7, 1997, Representative Wally Herger of California introduced
House Bill 193 to prohibit designation of the Mt. Shasta area in California as a
national monument under the Antiquities Act.” Id. at 94.

CONVERTDOC.INPUT.593072.DSQ9K (DO NOT DELETE)

116

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

1/17/2018 10:44 PM

[Vol. 37:1

President Clinton made when he created the monument.”63 Among those
promises were that the protected area would be managed under multiple
use principles; that valid existing rights would be honored; that grazing
could continue; that no federal water rights either express or implied
would be part of the reservation; that the state’s jurisdiction over fish
and wildlife would be untouched by the designation; and that an
advisory committee and planning team for management purposes would
be established—a veritable litany of local and interest groups concerned
about federal control over monument lands.64 Further bills were
introduced requiring congressional approval with the concurrence of or
consultation with the governor of the state where the proposed
monument was located.65 One bill required the concurrence of state
legislatures,66 reflecting concerns about state non-involvement in the
process.
In the spring of 1997, Senator Murkowski introduced another bill,
this one to “ensure that the public and Congress have both the right and
a reasonable opportunity to participate in decisions that affect the use
and management of all public lands owned or controlled by the
Government of the United States.”67 This would be achieved by creating
notice and comment opportunities in the monument designation process
for the public as well as for federal, state and local governments. 68 A
year later, a Utah Congressman introduced a bill to modify the
monument’s boundaries to remove four towns, a producing oil field, and
a highway, with a caveat that the proposal should not be “construed as
constituting congressional approval, explicit or implicit” of the
monument’s establishment.69
These bills are interesting to the extent that they reflect many of the
objections that critics of the law have—that designating a monument
would harm existing economic interests, lock up important resources,
and be a showcase for federal excesses, and oust existing state
jurisdiction over important resources like wildlife, and that the process
excludes any input from state and local governments as well as the
affected public. Yet despite the concerns animating these bills, none of
63

Id.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 95.
68
Id.
69
Id. Although the bill did not pass, President Clinton accepted the boundary
changes in a later bill when he signed that bill into law. Id.
64
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them was enacted. Although Congress clearly has this power, it chose
not to exercise it, perhaps because of the low likelihood that a President
would sign into law legislation that would constrain or revoke the broad
discretion given to Presidents under the Antiquities Act.”70 Even more
unlikely would be the ability of western states, which are most directly
affected by the Antiquities Act, to secure the approval of eastern states
for such a bill when a vote would be perceived by their electorates as
anti-environmental and might jeopardize their seats on a matter of no
particular concern to them.71
C. Statutory Purpose and Uses Over Time
The primary purpose animating passage of the Antiquities Act was
the “desire of archaeologists to protect aboriginal objects and
artifacts.”72 Contrary to most European countries at the time, United
States laws granted little protection to archaeological and historic
objects prior to the Act.73 Before President Theodore Roosevelt
protected 800,000 acres by designating the Grand Canyon National
Monument,74 Presidents “used the Act only for small areas of federal
land that were of either historical or archeological interest.”75
Presidential designations protected “specific objects of unusual
historical or scientific value that [stood] out from the landscape by virtue
of their extraordinary beauty.”76
70

Id. at 95-96.
Id. at 96.
72
Squillace, supra note 25, at 477; see also Matthew W. Harrison, Legislative
Delegation and Presidential Authority: The Antiquities Act and the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument—A Call for a New Judicial Examination,
13 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 409, 413-14 (1998) (“The Act's passage was the
culmination of more than six years of lobbying by archeologists and scientific
institutions who were working to protect important archeological and historical
sites in the newly-settled western United States. The main purpose behind the Act
was to protect specific items of antiquity, such as ruins, pottery, and picture
graphs.”); Iraola, supra note 3, at 162 (“In 1906, Congress passed the Antiquities
Act, both to respond to concerns over damage to archaeological sites and provide a
swift means to safeguard federal resources and lands.”).
73
Lin, supra note 17, at 713. See also id. at 721 (“In most instances, however,
presidential designation followed Congressional inaction or failed attempts to reach
consensus.”).
74
Harrison, supra note 72, at 416.
75
Id. at 417.
76
Ranchod, supra note 10, at 569.
71
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One of the original sponsors of the Antiquities Act, Congressman
John Lacey, however, worried about “waste and misuse of natural
resources—about, as he put it, mankind’s ‘omnidestructive’ ways. If
such destruction continue[d], he warned, the world would become ‘as
worthless as a sucked orange.’”77 In this way, he said, the “Antiquities
Act is a counterweight to the pressures that drive us toward expediency.
The Act forces us to think in the long term and on a large scale, to
occasionally make the choice to leave our children and their Earth more
than a series of small, isolated parks.”78
It took over half a century to have Congressman Lacey’s concern
acted on in a grand way by a President using his authority under the
Antiquities Act. President Clinton’s national monument designations
shifted the focus of the Act from protecting structures and scientific
objects to protecting entire ecosystems from threats to those landscapes.
These Clinton monuments protect lands that were part of a major river’s
drainage basin, a forest, or a desert ecosystem,79 regardless of whether
there was a discernible natural feature, like Devils Tower. They were
very large, much larger in size that those that protected single structures
or individual objects of scientific interest.80 For example, Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument encompasses 1.9 million acres
of BLM lands in southern Utah:81 a size equivalent to the states of
Delaware and Rhode Island combined, and covers most of two large
Utah counties.82 It is one of the “largest national monuments located

77

Sellars, supra note 8, at 286-87.
Sanders, supra note 9, at 7.
79
Ranchod, supra note 10, at 569 (“Most of the landscape monuments protect
natural ecosystems. The Grand Canyon-Parashant National Monument was created,
for example, to protect lands that are part of the drainage basin for the Colorado
River and the Grand Canyon. Other landscape monuments protect canyonlands,
coastal areas, and forest, shrub-steppe, marine, riparian, and desert ecosystems.”).
80
Squillace, supra note 25, at 513 (“The vast literature that has developed in recent
years describing landscape ecology and ecosystem management offers strong
support for the claim that a landscape or ecosystem is a legitimate object of
scientific interest.”).
81
Thomas Cannon, Utah Association of Counties v. Bush: A Look at How the
Federal District Court of Utah Upheld the Creation of the Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument Through the Antiquities Act, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES
& ENVTL. L. 63, 63 (2005).
82
Harrison, supra note 72, at 410.
78
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within the continental United States.”83 By doing this, President Clinton
“reestablished the Antiquities Act as one of the most powerful
conservation tools available to the executive.” 84
Although not a declared purpose, an indirect benefit of the Act’s
application has been to protect lands surrounding the monument that
otherwise might have been vulnerable to development because
protective legislation was languishing in Congress.85 An example of this
was President Carter’s designation of 19 monuments in Alaska that
protected fifty-six million acres of land from development while
legislation to protect these areas was stymied in Congress. 86 National
monument proclamations layer on additional protections to federal lands
“by withdrawing them from entry, location, sale, or other disposition
under the public land laws—that is, from mining, logging, oil and gas
production, grazing, off-road vehicles, and other such uses.”87 “These
restrictions are effectively permanent,”88 disrupting settled expectations
of individuals and companies whose livelihoods had depended on
extracting renewable and nonrenewable resources from these lands.
The allowable uses of lands reserved to protect a designated
monument vary monument to monument according to the purposes for

Ranchod, supra note 10, at 570. “Clinton established five of the ten largest
monuments established by presidential proclamation in the lower forty-eight
states.” Id.
84
Id. at 582; see also id. (“[T]his executive leadership was justified and proper
given the history of congressional acquiescence to expansive use of the Act,
judicial interpretation of the Act, and political considerations.”).
85
Lin, supra note 17, at 736 (“Nevertheless, given the sometimes glacial progress
of proposed legislation, there is some value to a process that can react seasonably to
time-sensitive, though not ‘emergency,’ matters.”); see also Adrian Vermeule,
Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 673, 684 (2015) (“The veto-gates;
second, third, and nth opinions; and interbranch checks and balances that, in a
Madisonian system, are intended to promote reasoned deliberation, and launder out
passion and interest, together ensure that legislatures will ‘come too late’ to the
resolution of an increasing fraction of policy problems.”); id. (“Even so, Congress’s
agenda is so radically compacted and constrained that it is routine for critical policy
problems to languish indefinitely on the congressional docket even as extant law
becomes risibly maladapted to the relevant problems as the policy environment
changes over time.”).
86
Presidential Statement on Designation of National Monuments in Alaska, in 1978
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, Jimmy Carter (1980).
87
Sanders, supra note 9, at 4.
88
Id.
83
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which each monument is created.89 These uses are set forth in a land-use
management plan prepared by the agency with jurisdiction over the land
housing the monument.90 The new large landscape monuments shifted
management from the National Park Service (NPS), which traditionally
had managed national monuments, to land management agencies like
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service (FS)
because the protected lands fell within their jurisdictions.91 Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument is the first monument BLM has
managed; Giant Sequoia National Monument is the first one the FS has
managed.92
One effect of shifting management from NPS to BLM and FS is the
application of a less protective management standard, which allows
“compatible uses.”93 This more forgiving standard is different than the
requirement in the National Park Service Organic Act that lands in that
system be left “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations,”94 a
management mandate that is not specifically stated in the Antiquities
Squillace, supra note 25, at 519 (“[N]ational monuments are a bit like
snowflakes, each with a character of its own.”).
90
Sellars, supra note 8, at 282. Seven of the twenty World Heritage sites, places
considered to have “outstanding international significance,” were initially protected
under the Antiquities Act. Id.
91
One interesting feature of BLM-managed monuments is that they are “managed
in partnership with the surrounding communities. This arrangement means that
BLM has no public facilities on its monuments’ grounds, which forces visitors to
patronize local communities.” Ranchod, supra note 10, at 572. National
monuments managed by the BLM are to be managed in partnership with the
surrounding communities. To this end, the BLM will not provide major facilities
for food, lodging, or visitor services within landscape monuments. Rather, visitors
will be encouraged to see the lands in their primitive states, and access will be
limited to certain areas. Visitor contact and information facilities may be located in
adjacent communities or on the periphery of units. “For example, the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument management plan limits visitor
development to peripheral land on the outer four percent of the monument.” Id.
This may explain the economic uptick in these communities after the enthusiasm of
monument designation.
92
Id. at 570. Ten other monuments created by Clinton are also managed
exclusively by BLM. Id.
93
Id. at 571; see also Sanders, supra note 9, at 5 (“The BLM and the Forest Service
come at land management from a ‘multiple use’ perspective that tends, on paper
and in practice, to be more permissive than the Park Service’s clear preservation
mandate.”).
94
16 U.S.C. § 1 (current version at 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a)).
89
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Act.95 While existing commercial activities are permitted on national
parkland, subject to “valid existing rights,”96 new ones, like mining, oil
and gas development, and logging, are generally prohibited by the
nonimpairment standard.97 Thus, Clinton and Obama’s designations of
monuments on multi-purpose federal land (public domain and national
forest lands) actually weakened protection for them, even though each
President withdrew an enormous amount of land from new extractive
uses.98
D. Judicial Interpretation of the President’s Authority under the Act
Courts provide almost no check on the President’s authority under
the Antiquities Act. Judges limit their review of presidential
designations to the question of whether “the President has facially
exercised his discretion in accordance with the Act’s standards,” and
generally broadly interpret the President’s authority under the Act.99
This judicial deference extends to whether the geographic area protected
by the designation is properly sized and whether the objects qualify for
protection.100
Sellars, supra note 8, at 317. However, while Sellars notes that the NPSOA “did
not alter the authorization and facilitation of professional research in the
monuments . . . it did specifically authorize public use and enjoyment to take place
on site in the monuments, a mandate that differed from the Antiquities Act's
emphasis on education through universities and museums. Thus, like the national
parks, the national monuments would themselves become outdoor education
centers.”).
96
Sanders, supra note 9, at 5.
97
See National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (current version at 54
U.S.C. § 100101(a)) (“The service thus established shall promote and regulate the
use of the federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and reservations
hereinafter specified . . . by such means and measures as conform to the
fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments and reservations, which purpose
is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”)
(emphasis added); see also Ranchod, supra note 10, at 572; id. (“All Clintoncreated monuments have been withdrawn from disposition under the Mining Act of
1872.”).
98
Ranchod, supra note 10, at 573.
99
Iraola, supra note 3, at 184.
100
Id. at 185-86 (“With respect to the second substantive requirement, that the
designation of the national monument ‘be confined to the smallest area compatible
with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected[,]’ courts
95
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[W]here a claim concerns not a want of [presidential] power, but a
mere excess or abuse of discretion in exerting a power given, it is clear
that it involves considerations which are beyond the reach of judicial
power. This must be since, as this court has often pointed out, the
judicial may not invade the legislative or executive departments so as
to correct alleged mistakes or wrongs arising from asserted abuse of
discretion.101

Thus, the Court in Cameron v. United States102 quickly dispatched
an argument by petitioner that the Grand Canyon lacked any historical
or scientific interest.103 While the Court does not directly address the
language in the Act requiring that the monument’s size should be the
“smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the
objects to be protected,” the “clear implication of the Court’s decision
was that the size of the monument was not disqualifying if the ‘protected
object’ was otherwise of ‘scientific interest.’”104
In Cappaert v. United States, the United States sought to enjoin
groundwater pumping by a local farmer, which lowered the water level
in Devil’s Hole, an important feature in Death Valley National
Monument.105 The Court dismissed an argument challenging the
historical and scientific value of Death Valley National Monument,
explaining that while the Act allows for areas to be designated that have
either historical or scientific value, because the Death Valley National
Monument had both historical and scientific interests, the President
acted within his delegated authority when he designated the
monument.106 In Tulare County v. Bush,107 relying on Cappaert, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals also inferentially supported the concept of
landscape or ecosystem designations to the extent that the decision held
that the President’s authority under the Act was “not limited to
protecting only archaeological sites”; nor did the Act “‘impose upon the
generally accord to the President's factual determinations substantial judicial
deference.”).
101
Cannon, supra note 81, at 67 (quoting Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474
(1994)).
102
252 U.S. 450 (1920).
103
Harrison, supra note 72, at 418.
104
Squillace, supra note 25, at 492.
105
426 U.S. 128 (1976); Harrison, supra note 72, at 418.
106
Harrison, supra note 72, at 418.
107
306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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President an obligation to make any particular investigation’ regarding
the scope and size of the designated memorial.”108
In a 1978 case involving a jurisdictional dispute between California
and the United States over the waters and submerged lands in the
Channel Islands National Monument,109 the Supreme Court continued an
expansionist view of the Antiquities Act’s scope by affirming President
Truman’s earlier reservation of submerged lands and the waters over
those lands as part of a national monument.110 “[T]he Court recognized
that, although the Act refers to “lands,” it authorizes the reservation of
waters located on or over federal lands.”111
U.S. district courts, for the most part, have followed the Supreme
Court’s lead. In Wyoming v. Franke,112 involving a challenge to
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s designation of 220,000 acres as
the Jackson Hole National Monument, the U.S. District Court of
Wyoming found “sufficient evidence of historic and scientific interest to
uphold the basic designation of the national monument,”113 saying, “if
there be evidence in the case of a substantial character upon which the
President may have acted in declaring that there were objects of historic
of [sic] scientific interest included within the area, it is sufficient upon
which he may have based a discretion.”114 The District Court Judge
added:
[T]his seems to be a controversy between the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government in which, under the evidence
presented here, the Court cannot interfere. Undoubtedly great hardship
and a substantial amount of injustice will be done to the State and her
citizens if the Executive Department carries out its threatened program,
but if Congress presumes to delegate its inherent authority to
Executive Departments which exercise acquisitive proclivities not
108

Iraola, supra note 3, at 178.
United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978).
110
Iraola, supra note 3, at 174. Those lands and waters were eventually conveyed
to California. Id.
111
Id.
112
58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
113
Harrison, supra note 72, at 420-21.
114
Id. at 421 (quoting Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 895 (D. Wyo. 1945).
Harrison noted, however that the court “refused to determine whether the national
monument designation was the smallest area compatible to protect the legitimate
interest,” considering that “that this question was outside the court's jurisdiction. It
further refused to determine whether the president’s designating the national
monument were arbitrary or capricious . . . .” Id.
109
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actually intended, the burden is on the Congress to pass such remedial
legislation as may obviate any injustice brought about as the power
and control over and disposition of government lands inherently rests
in its Legislative Branch. What has been said with reference to the
objects of historic and scientific interest applies equally to the
discretion of the Executive in defining the area compatible with the
proper care and management of the objects to be protected.115

For the court, as long as there was “evidence ‘of a substantial
character’” supporting the President’s determination that there were
objects of scientific or historic interest on the withdrawn public lands,
which also supported the determination that the withdrawn acreage was
compatible with the care and management of those objects, “any further
judicial review with respect to the President’s exercise of discretion
under the Act was not permitted.”116
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Bush,117 petitioners
challenged President Clinton’s designation of six New Mexico national
monuments on ultra vires grounds, among other claims.118 The basis of
the ultra vires challenge was that only Congress had the power to make
rules affecting public lands.119 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the ultra vires
claim on the ground that President Clinton “exercised his delegated
115

Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 896; see also Harrison, supra note 72, at 422.
Iraola, supra note 3, at 182. “The court further noted that given the nature of the
controversy, the ‘burden [wa]s on the Congress to pass such remedial legislation as
may obviate any injustice brought about as the power and control over and
disposition of government lands inherently rests in its Legislative branch.’” Id.; see
also id. at 171 (“In the case of the Antiquities Act, while it grants the President
broad discretion, and separation of powers concerns are present, the statute also
contains some restrictions. Judicial review ‘is available to ensure that the
Proclamations are consistent with constitutional principles and that the President
has not exceeded his statutory authority.’”); Cannon, supra note 81, at 70
(describing the court’s decision in Utah Association of Counties, and saying “[t]he
court continued what has become the tradition in preventing parties from bringing
any causes of action against the President for a violation of the Antiquities Act.” In
deciding that it would not decide on the exercise of the President's discretion, the
court quoted Justice Scalia's concurrence in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S.
788, 827 (1992), who said, “I think we cannot issue a declaratory judgment against
the President. It is incompatible with his constitutional position that he be
compelled personally to defend his executive actions before the court.”).
117
306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 61 (2003).
118
Iraola, supra note 3, at 176.
119
Id.
116
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powers under the Antiquities Act, and that statute include[d] intelligible
principles to guide the President’s action.”120
The one potential caveat to this unbroken chain of court decisions
affirming Presidential authority to designate national monuments is an
unpublished bench ruling in a case challenging President Carter’s
designation of nineteen monuments in Alaska. In that case, the U.S.
District Court for Alaska indicated that there might be limits to the
amount of acreage that a President could withdraw under the Act.121 The
judge found that the land President Carter reserved “was more than
necessary” to protect objects identified as having historic or scientific
interest,122 and that the withdrawn lands exceeded the amount of land
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the designations. 123 But, the judge
admitted that “while the ‘outer parameters’ of presidential discretion
under the Act had ‘not yet been drawn by judicial decision,’” President
Carter’s proclamations at issue did not exceed his authority under the
Act.124 In the wake of President Carter’s action, Congress enacted strict
procedural limitations on the future use of the Antiquities Act in Alaska,
preventing any future designations of “large tracts of federal lands as
national monuments” in Alaska.125
Congress appears to have delegated to the President fairly
unbounded authority to protect lands and the structures and objects on
them, if they hold any archaeological or scientific interest. For over 111
years, Presidents of both political parties have exercised their authority
under the Act to protect small plots of land like President Lincoln and
Soldiers’ Home National Monument (2.3 acres), in Washington D.C.
protected by President Clinton, or Cabrillo National Monument
120

Id. at 176 (quoting Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)).
121
See Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853 (D.
Alaska 1980) (challenging President Carter’s use of the Antiquities Act to establish
fifteen new national monuments, expand two existing ones, and withdraw more
than fifty-six million acres in Alaska); see also Harrison, supra note 72, at 430.
122
Id. at 430-31.
123
Id. at 431.
124
Iraola, supra note 3, at 184.
125
Harrison, supra note 72, at 431 n.148 (discussing 16 U.S.C. §3213(a) (1994)
(“The Land Conservation Act provided a procedural limitation that any future
national monument designations in Alaska would not be allowed without a
congressional hearing and approval of the national monument within a certain time
period.”); see also Lin, supra note 17, at 716 (“ANILCA also made potential future
withdrawals in Alaska under the Antiquities Act of more than 5,000 acres subject
to congressional approval.”).
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protected by President Taft (0.50 acres) in California and huge
landscapes, like Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument
protected by President Clinton (1,700,000 acres) in Arizona or Glacier
Bay protected by President Coolidge (1,164,800 acres) in Alaska.126
Congress, with rare exception, has not intervened; the courts not at all.
By statutory design, neither the public nor its elected officials play any
official role in the designation process, a process that often ends with a
land use decision disrupting prior uses of the land. At least one sponsor
of the legislation, Congressman Lacey had that result in mind even
though it appears to have caught succeeding generation of legislators by
surprise as they react to more expansive uses of the Act in an era of
legislative stalemate.
The next Part of the article uses this background information as a
platform from which to observe some of the modern controversies
generated by the Act’s application as well as more general criticisms of
its provisions.
III. CONTROVERSIES ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIFIC MONUMENT
DESIGNATIONS AND GENERAL CRITICISM OF THE ACT
In one form or another, there are Boston Tea parties still going on
every day in some part of America in infinite varieties of the
constitutional right to seek a redress of grievances.127

Individual monument designations have incited opposition from
local communities surrounding the monuments. Local disapproval
generally focuses on anticipated adverse economic impacts and lifestyle
changes caused by designation of a national monument, loss of revenue
from traditional sources like ranching and mining, and federal overregulation of the protected area. Western lawmakers and extractive
industries, like mining, oil, and gas, “resent” orders emanating from
Washington that restrict their operations on public lands.128 More
generally, the Act is criticized for the undemocratic nature of the
designation process, the President’s usurpation of congressional
126

Ranchod, supra note 10, at app. A at 585-88.
Scott W. Reed, The County Supremacy Movement: Mendacious Myth
Marketing, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 525, 526 (1994).
128
Ranchod, supra note 10, at 584 (“Although the American public generally
supports greater protection of unique federal lands, western lawmakers and
politically powerful extractive industries resent orders from Washington, D.C,
restricting the use of federal lands.”).
127
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authority to manage the public lands, and ineffective judicial review of
presidential actions under the Act.129 Some of these criticisms dovetail
with the less focused economic and cultural criticisms.
As made clear below, the criticisms of the Antiquities Act and of
specific designations like Bears Ears reflect the general anti-federal
feelings in the Intermountain West. As those feelings modulate and the
specific complaints about the negative effects of designation prove to be
untrue over time, the resistance to both the law and specific designations
should disappear, and, in fact, is already lessening.
A. The Political and Cultural Firestorms around Bears Ears and Grand
Staircase-Escalante Designations
San Juan County, the site of both Bears Ears and Grand StaircaseEscalante national monuments is the largest county in Utah. 130 The
federal government manages 61.4% of the land in the county and Indian
tribes, principally the Navajo Nation, governs 25.2% of the land, leaving
the state, controlling only 5.3%, and private and local governments
controlling a mere 8.1% of the land.131 The County is also the least
populous in the state and has the lowest per-capita income.132 Not
surprisingly, given these statistics, the County is also ground zero for
opposition to the Antiquities Act and the designation of national
monuments under that statute.
The over-heated rhetoric employed, and subsequent flurry of bills
introduced by Utah’s congressional delegation after President Obama’s
designation of Bears Ears in San Juan County illustrate this opposition.
For example, U.S. Representative Rob Bishop, chair of the House
Committee on Natural Resources, “called President Obama’s
monuments a ‘surreptitious land grab’ and an ‘authoritarian act’ of
‘presidential bullying,’” and “vowed to push legislation” to “right size”

See Lin, supra note 17, at 725 (“the anti-monument discourse advocating local
governance and democratic participation potentially reveals itself as no more than a
rhetorical front for interest groups seeking to achieve particular policy outcomes.”).
130
JOHN C. RUPLE, ROBERT B. KEITER & ANDRE OGNIBENE, NATIONAL
MONUMENTS AND NATIONAL CONSERVATION AREAS: A COMPARISON IN LIGHT OF
THE BEARS EARS PROPOSAL, Stegner Center, White Paper No. 2016-02 (2016) at 2.
131
Id.
132
Id.
129
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the monument.133 Other members of Congress share Representative
Bishop’s outrage and have consequently introduced twelve bills to
curtail or revoke Presidential authority under the Antiquities Act,
carrying titles like the Preserving State Rights Act (H.R. 4132, 114th
Cong. (2015)) and Protecting Local Communities from Executive
Overreach Act (H.R. 3946, 114th Cong. (2015)).134 Among the list of
things these bills would do is to
require advance approval from states or local communities or both;
limit new monuments to 5,000 acres; require Congress and the affected
state to approve any new monument either before or within three years
of its designation; preclude new monuments in certain counties, states,
or off-road vehicle areas; prohibit the reservation of federal water
rights; preclude the restriction of allowable uses absent public
comment and congressional approval; require public hearings; and
subject new designations to review under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA).135

The response to Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument
serves as a helpful model for understanding many of the criticisms
levelled against Presidential use of the Antiquities Act. President
Clinton’s designation of that monument, its size and the lack of
consultation with state and local officials, and complete absence of
public participation during the designation process created significant
opposition to the monument.136 Critics additionally complained that it
“was not within the spirit of the law” because it was “a leap from
protecting the large ruins of the southwest as contemplated by the
Antiquities Act to protecting ‘packrat middens,’ that were identified in

Corbin Hlar, et al., Bishop vows bills aimed at Bears Ears, ‘damn’ Antiquities
Act, E & E NEWS (April 26, 2017),
http://www.eenews.net/eedaily/stories/1060053590/print.
134
Sanders, supra note 9, at 5.
134
Sanders, supra note 9, at 5.
135
Id.
136
Cannon, supra note 81, at 65 (“President Clinton's action created heavy
controversy, which was exacerbated by the lack of advance consultation with
Utah's federal and state officials. Of particular insult to these officials was the fact
that the Grand Staircase announcement was made in Arizona at the Grand Canyon,
not in Utah. Part of the controversy came because the federal royalties from the
Smokey Hollow Coal Mine would have been around twenty billion dollars, half of
which would have gone to Utah.”).
133
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the GSENM’s proclamation.”137 They also argued that the creation of
the monument was purely for “political not preservation reasons” and
barred development of the Kaiparowits coal field, one of the “nation’s
most precious coal resource.”138 State and local officials were concerned
about the effect of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument on
176,000 acres of Utah’s school trust lands in the designated area and the
revenues the state might otherwise receive from mining on those lands,
estimated to be around $300 billion in total, of which $2 billion would
go into the state’s school trust fund.139 Local communities adjacent to
the monument feared its designation would chill new employment, slow
economic growth, and lead to over-regulation of the public lands that
surround them.140 While a similar uproar followed President Obama’s
designation of Bears Ears National Monument,141 President Obama,
unlike President Clinton, gave fair warning of his interest in preserving
the core of what became the national monument when it included Cedar
Mesa on a 2010 list of candidate sites for protection under the
Antiquities Act.142 This action precipitated both formal and informal
discussions on how the area might be preserved, which, in 2015, led to a
formal request from a coalition of local Indians to President Obama to
designate a 1.9 million acre monument.143 In contrast, President Clinton
held no public meetings and arguably “hid the ball” from the public as
well as state and local officials until he announced the Grand StaircaseEscalante monument’s designation from the rim of the Grand Canyon. 144
Many of the complaints voiced following both designations are
easily responded to. For example, money raised from school trust lands
make up only a small proportion of a school district’s overall budget—in
137

Quigley, supra note 55, at 101.
Id.
139
Harrison, supra note 72, at 410-11.
140
Id. at 411. In fact, Utah’s Office of Tourism is spending millions of dollars
promoting the state’s five national parks and “boasting” that they attract several
million visitors a year from all over the world, four of which were first protected
under the Antiquities Act. John D. Leshy & Mark Squillace, The Endangered
Antiquities Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2017, at A23.
141
See generally Julie Turkewitz, A Vast Divide, Fight Intensifies as Trump
Rethinks Monument Status for Utah Expanse, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2017, at A11
(recounting many of the local objections to the monument designation).
142
Jonathan Thompson, Fact-checking Trump’s Antiquities Act order, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS 2 (April 26, 2017), http://www.hcn.org/articles/fact-checkinghatch-trump-on-bears-ears-national-monument/print_view.
143
Id.
144
Cannon, supra note 81, at 65.
138
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San Juan County, one percent of its school budget—and are distributed
statewide.145 In addition, the state retains control over school trust lands
and the schools received $50 million from the federal government from
the Grand Staircase-Escalante monument designation in a land exchange
with the federal government.146 The state school board rejected a similar
proposal from the Obama Administration.147 Ironically a report by the
Wilderness Society found that Utah has sold off 54% of the original 7.5
million acres in school trust lands which it received upon becoming a
state148 and that, according to the Census Bureau, Utah spends less per
student than any state in the Union.149 The Bears Ears Monument’s final
boundaries excluded areas rich with both paleontological and uranium
resources as well as other areas where historically there was drilling for
oil, and there are no pending leases within the monument boundaries.150
The proclamation preserves existing grazing leases and new ones are
allowed.151
As for killing jobs and destroying the local economy, a 2017 report
by Headwater Economics, which examined “gateway communities”
adjacent to seventeen monuments of 10,000 acres or more in eleven
Western states designated between 1982 and 2001, found “no evidence”
that these designations inhibited economic growth.152 In fact, the report
found that “the local economies surrounding all 17 of the national
monuments studied expanded following the creation of the new national
monuments.”153 “Across the board, trends in important economic
indicators either continued or improved” in each of the areas studied,
including a rise in personal wealth, which the report found significant
because in rural areas this indicator is often declining. 154 The report also
145

Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
147
Id.
148
Scott Streater, Federal transfers to Utah would shut pubic out—report, E & E
NEWS (May 22, 2017),
http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060054918/print.
149
Id.
150
Thompson, supra note 142, at 4.
151
Id. at 5.
152
HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, UPDATED SUMMARY: THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE
OF NATIONAL MONUMENTS TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES 3 (2017).
153
Id. at 1. While the report data showed “continued economic growth in nearby
communities,” the data “do not demonstrate a cause a cause-and-effect
relationship” between monument designation and economic growth. Id.
154
Id.
146
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noted that “protected natural amenities,” like national monuments and
their surrounding land, “help sustain property values and attract new
investments.”155 According to the report, these communities had an
increase in non-labor income (investments, real estate, and government
paychecks like social security) of $189 million in 2015—an increase of
49% from 2001—and service jobs (teaching, engineering, health related)
increased by 42% over the same period, with per-capita income
increasing by 17% to nearly $36,000 on average.156 As for the counties
hosting the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, they
“experienced strong growth after the designation of the monument,
continuing previous growth trends.” Overall, from 2001-2015 in the
Grand Staircase-Escalante Region, population grew by 13%, jobs by
24%, real personal income by 32%, and real per capita income by
17%).157 There is no reason not to expect a similar growth in local
economy from the designation of the Bears Ears National Monument,
which explains why the Utah State Tourist Board is promoting the new
monument.158
There have been other examples of political backlash to monument
designations in the not too distant past. For example, a Republicancontrolled Congress refused to appropriate funds for ten years for the
management of the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Monument, designated by
President Eisenhower in 1961, after a Democrat-controlled Congress
refused to protect the area.159 President Lyndon Johnson’s last minute
signature on proclamations enlarging Arches and Capitol Reef national
monuments provoked angry rhetoric from Utah’s Senators who
criticized the President’s “unilateral and arbitrary” action.160 Utah
Senator Bob Bennett “proclaimed President Johnson’s national
monuments a ‘last gasp attempt to embalm a little more land in the
West.’”161 However, the vehemence and sustained nature of the outcry
against President Clinton and President Obama’s designations and the
use of the presidential bully pulpit to oppose their national monuments

155

Id. at 2.
Jennifer Yachnin, Communities near large sites see economic growth—report, E
& E NEWS (June 1, 2017),
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060055414/print.
157
HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, supra note 152, at 1.
158
Thompson, supra note 142, at 5.
159
Lin, supra note 17, at 716.
160
Id.
161
Sanders, supra note 9, at 5.
156
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are unusual.162
B. General Criticisms of the Antiquities Act and the Response to Those
Claims
Typical criticisms of the Antiquities Act focus on two issues: the
Act’s alleged usurpation of Congress’ authority under the Property
Clause “to make all needful rules,” respecting the property of the United
States163 and on the Act’s undemocratic lack of public participation in
the designation process.164 Since withdrawals under the Antiquities Act
are “more permanent,” they argue that they “should be subject to greater
procedural requirements and more thorough deliberation to ensure
careful and well-informed decisions.”165 Additionally, critics perceive
the Act’s designation process as “unfair” because of the limited
opportunity for affected communities and local interests to participate in
the decision-making process and the adverse effects of designations on
those same communities and on those who use public lands.166
Supporters of the Act have responses for each of those arguments and
argue that strong executive authority, like that found in the Antiquities
Act, is necessary if public lands are to be preserved for future
generations.167
1. Legal concerns.
Opponents of the Antiquities Act frequently raise multiple legal
concerns, for example that the statute divests Congress of its
constitutional responsibility to make “all needful rules” regarding the
sale and management of United States property in violation of the
Property Clause of the Constitution. They also contend that the Act
162

See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Christopher Yoo, The Bounds of Executive
Discretion in the Regulatory State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1593 (2016) (“The
President’s power to cajole has been well-established and acknowledged to be
influential.”).
163
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
164
Squillace, supra note 25, at 474-75.
165
Lin, supra note 17, at 733.
166
Sanders, supra note 9, at 5-6 (“The Antiquities Act’s critics raise three
objections most often: (1) the Act appropriates power that properly resides with
Congress under the Property Clause (or with the states); (2) democracy and
informed decision making demand that the public have the right to review and
comment on proposed designations; and (3) national monument designations harm
the economies of local communities.”).
167
Id. at 6-7.
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violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the
President’s actions are not preceded by public notice and comment, and
that it runs counter to NEPA, which requires that major federal actions
significantly affecting the human environment must be accompanied by
a statement describing and analyzing those impacts.168 The silver lining
to the concerns raised under the APA and NEPA is that they “underscore
the degree to which procedures for public notice and comment, such as
those required by the Administrative Procedure Act (in the context of
rulemaking) and NEPA, have become engrained in the public’s
understanding of democratic norms.”169
a. Violates the Property Clause.
Critics argue that the Property Clause170 gave Congress, not the
President, the power to manage public lands.171 Therefore, the President
has no authority to affect public lands by designating objects on those
lands as national monuments or withdrawing those land to protect
objects on them. However, Congress has specifically delegated that
authority to the President in the Antiquities Act.
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Bush172 upheld that delegation
when it rejected a challenge to President Clinton’s designation of six
New Mexico national monuments on ultra vires grounds.173
Petitionerargued, in part, that only Congress had the power to make
rules affecting public lands.174 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, however, disagreed, and affirmed the lower court
decision, finding that President Clinton had properly exercised his
delegated powers under the Antiquities Act, which contained intelligible
principles to guide his action.175 The contention by “legal formalists and
168

See, e.g., Cannon, supra note 81, at 66-67 (raising many of these claims).
Cannon also argues that the APA applies because, in the case of Grand StaircaseEscalante designation, the Secretary of Interior made the final decision. Id. While it
is true that the Secretary of Interior makes recommendations to the President about
which monuments should be designated, puts together a report, and drafts the
declaration, only the President signs and issues the designating proclamation. Id. at
68.
169
Lin, supra note 17, at 738.
170
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
171
See Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 4.
172
306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 812 (2003).
173
Id. at 1137.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 174-76.
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originalists . . . that the Antiquities Act, in giving the president wideranging power to designate national monuments, violates the nondelegation doctrine and intrudes on Congress’s plenary authority over
the federal public lands”176 is easily met by Mountain States’ finding
that the Antiquities Act has “intelligible principles” to guide the
President’s actions. Additionally, “court decisions upholding the Act
against all manner of challenges, and the fact that Congress has the last
word on whether particular monuments, and indeed the Act itself,
remain on the books,” also counter the formalist/originalist
arguments.177
b. Violates the Administrative Procedure Act.
The Act’s detractors also argue that Presidents who designate
monuments under the Antiquities Act are violating the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). Although the APA does not specifically exclude
the President from its scope, courts have held that it does.178 Since only
the President has affirmative duties under the Antiquities Act, for the
APA to apply, therefore, an agency, like BLM or the FS, not the
President, must make the decision to designate a national monument.
But only Presidents have the delegated authority to designate national
monuments.
Proponents of this argument contend that Executive Order No.
176

Sanders, supra note 9, at 5.
Id.
178
See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-801 (1992) (“The APA
defines ‘agency’ as ‘each authority of the Government of the United States,
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not
include—(A) the Congress; (B) the courts of the United States; (C) the
governments of the territories or possessions of the United States; (D) the
government of the District of Columbia.’ 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(b)(1), 551(1). The
President is not explicitly excluded from the APA's purview, but he is not explicitly
included, either. Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique
constitutional position of the President, we find that textual silence is not enough to
subject the President to the provisions of the APA. We would require an express
statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President's performance of
his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.”); see also Cannon,
supra note 81, at 71. In their unsuccessful challenge to President Clinton’s
designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, “plaintiffs
argued that the action by the Secretary of the Interior could be a final agency
action, but the court dismissed that claim since the executive branch officers only
provided recommendations and assistance, not final action, as defined under the
APA.” Id.
177
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10,355,179 which grants the Secretary of the Department of Interior
authority to exercise the President’s land withdrawal authority and place
those lands in protected status, means the Secretary has the authority to
exercise the President’s delegated authority under the Antiquities Act to
designate national monuments.180 Putting aside the suspect nature of an
argument that contravenes clear statutory text, the argument seems
factually “dubious” because since the Order’s promulgation in 1925, the
President, not the Secretary of the Interior, has designated numerous
national monuments.181
c. Violates the National Environmental Policy Act.
For reasons similar to arguments against the application of the APA
to the President, namely that the President is not an agency and because
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) specifically exempts the
President from its reach, NEPA does not apply to a presidential
designation.182 Certainly, there may be sound policy reasons to apply
NEPA to the monument designation process. For example, NEPA
requires public participation, the input of local information,
identification of alternatives to monument designation, and a
demonstration of the costs and benefits of any proposed action.
However, those reasons cannot justify contradicting statutory design.
Arguments that it is really a federal agency official that designates a
national monument because of the pre-designation work that agencies
do, and that, therefore, NEPA applies, would fail for the same reasons
they do not work when applied to the APA – namely, that the
Antiquities Act only authorizes the President to designate national
monuments. Allowing or even inferring, as is the case here, a subdelegation of that authority would contradict the plain language of
section 431.
One aim of “constitutional design is to prevent the abuse of
179

Exec. Order No. 10,355, codified at 3 C.F.R. § 873 (1949-1953).
Cannon, supra note 81, at 69-70 (discussing power, elements required to meet it,
and why transfer is invalid because not approved by Congress).
181
Id. at 72.
182
See Harrison, supra note 72, at 427 (challenging Carter’s designation of national
monuments based on NEPA violation and failing on the grounds that “because the
President was ‘not a federal agency,’ he was not subject to NEPA's environmental
impact statement requirements.”). The doctrine of separation of powers also
counseled against “inferring a Congressional intent to impose such a duty on the
President.” Iraola, supra note 3, at 182 (quoting Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp.
1159, 1160 (D. Alaska 1978)).
180
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power.”183 Thus, while the legal concerns raised by opponents of the
Antiquities Act lack merit, underscoring each of them are abuse of
power concerns. However, largely consistent behavior by the three
branches of government with respect to protection of national
monuments for over a century belies these concerns and provides a
supportive interpretive gloss that prevents a President from contravening
the Act in a way that would, itself, constitute an abuse of power.
Congress remains a check on Executive over-reaching, and it is difficult
to dispute this long history, during which Presidents have designated
monuments and courts have upheld these designations, which only
rarely have been changed by Congress.184
2. Its implementation is undemocratic.
There may be more traction to criticisms of the Act that it fosters
undemocratic decision-making because neither the public nor its elected
officials participate in the designation process. This lack of public
process conflicts with “fundamental tenets of a participatory
democracy.”185 Supporters of the Act argue that public participation
183

Vermeule, supra note 85, at 674. Vermeule attributes the increase in executive
power generally to increasing congressional delegation to the Executive Branch and
independent agencies, increasing deference by courts to agencies “in a world in
which Congress has increasingly abdicated its policy responsibilities,” and the
Executive Branch’s penchant for increasing its own power to act unilaterally,
exploit “broad and vague delegations of power, vague constitutional powers, and
traditional pockets of discretion,” as a way of changing policies without getting
congressional authorization. Id. at 684-85.
184
Sanders, supra note 9, at 3.
185
Squillace, supra note 25, at 476; see also Lin, supra note 17, at 739 (“Standard
rationales for broad-based public involvement in agency decision-making include:
(1) promoting agency accountability and oversight; (2) reducing the potential for
agency capture; (3) providing better quality information; and (4) enhancing
proceduralist goals.”); Ann M. Eisenberg, Do Sagebrush Rebels Have a Colorable
Claim? The Space Between Parochialism and Exclusion in Federal Land
Management, 38 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 56, 86 (2017) (“Planners,
philosophers, and environmental justice theorists agree that ethical norms and legal
principles support the idea that people’s interest in participatory land use
decisionmaking transcends formal law.”). Eisenberg also identifies a “reverse
environmental justice” situation in that “the rhetoric used to justify vast public land
holdings in the West—that those lands ‘belong to all Americans’—evokes an
analogous subjugation of local will to “the greater good.” Id. at 85. She suggests a
“meaningful” collaborative form of decision-making with respect to the
management of public lands. Id. at 97-100.
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would make the designation process even more contentious and could
delay the protection of any qualified sites. They also note that Congress
has not seen fit to amend the law to make it more transparent even in an
era where many laws were enacted that included public participation,
and that the public can participate in the decisions governing the
management of protected sites at the agency level.
Public participation in governmental decision-making gives “a voice
to affected constituencies.”186 This helps assure that government
officials are better informed about the consequences of their actions,
thus fostering better decisions.187 “[A] public process can also help
achieve the virtues of civic republicanism,”188 by focusing on
deliberation that results in the virtuous political choice, leads to the
common good and improves the art of citizenship.189 Inviting interested
members of the public and groups into any governmental process not
only fosters democratic values, but can “defuse conflicts in a civil
manner.”190 James Rasband wonders if
aggressive use of the Antiquities Act [is] a repetition of this historical
pattern of conquest by certitude? Should we be so certain about the
altruism and correctness of our new preservation preference that we
eschew any legal obligation to consult with those rural communities
that have developed real and lasting attachments to the public lands, at

186

Squillace, supra note 25, at 571; see also Lin, supra note 17, at 471 (a rationale
that “posits that decisions are more likely to be viewed as legitimate if participants’
views have been fairly considered,” is likely to be the most relevant to the
Antiquities Act.)
187
Squillace, supra note 25, at 571. “While federal agencies may have a reasonable
grasp of the resources within a monument and the manner in which they might best
be protected, local officials and members of the public might well have additional
information regarding the resources that would be valuable in deciding the extent to
which lands should receive Antiquities Act protection.” Id. at 573.
188
Id. at 574.
189
Id. at 576. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT:
AMERICAN IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996) (discussing the virtues of
civic republicanism).
190
Lin, supra note 17, at 742; see also Adrian Vermeule, The Third Bound, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 1949, 1960-61 (2016) (commenting that “the ‘civilizing force of
hypocrisy,’ the inability to give openly partisan justifications in a transparent public
setting may actually constrain behavior, at least at the edges, if there is no plausible
public-spirited justification available as a pretext.”).
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least in part because of their reliance on public policies that
encouraged that attachment?191

Local accountability is often touted as the reason to favor legislative
over executive action.192 “Local concerns are voiced by legislators from
districts containing or dependent on public lands, and are thus less easily
overlooked or dismissed.”193 To be effective, the public must be
informed of any pending action so its concerns can be expressed to local
representatives. But, the Act contains no requirements that the
communities that host proposed national monuments be informed about
the pending designation, creating another potential flaw in the statute’s
structure.
Another benefit of public participation in the decision-making
process is that it can lessen the likelihood of agency capture by any
single interest group. But the President is not a narrowly focused
agency. The President responds to “a national constituency” unlike
individual members of Congress, and the American public owns the
nation’s public lands,194 making capture unlikely.195 In fact, by keeping
the public out of the designation process, the President is immunized
from pressure by local interests, enabling him “to make decisions from a
national perspective.”196
Those who fret about the lack of public involvement in the
191

James R. Rasband, The Future of the Antiquities Act, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 619, 633 (2001). Rasband’s comment about “conquest with certitude” is
a reference to Wilkinson’s statement that “the history of the American West has
been one of ‘conquest by certitude.’” Id. at 633. See also Eisenberg, supra note
185, at 86-87 (pointing to “communities and individuals’ reliance on the
longstanding history and continued persistence of the open-access model,” “their
reliance on the durability of their private claims to public lands,” and their reliance
“on particular resources and land uses for their livelihoods” as supporting their
entitlement claims).
192
Lin, supra note 17, at 736 (“A primary explanation for the preference of
legislative action is the assumption that congressional land management policy is
likely to be more responsive to the public interest because members of Congress
are more readily held accountable.”).
193
Id.
194
Id. at 737.
195
Id. at 740 (“[W]ith respect to agency capture, the risk of Antiquities Act
authority being ‘captured’ by industry and used inappropriately is minimal . . .
[and] largely inapplicable to the Presidency.”). Further “an act that provides only
the authority necessary to protect resources is less useful to industry.” Id.
196
Id. at 737.
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designation process and the resulting democracy deficit argue that lack
of public participation is a primary reason that the Act “should be
repealed or at least amended to require extensive public review.”197 They
point to other public land management laws that mandate public
decision-making, like FLPMA, and suggest their use as a possible model
for a revised Antiquities Act.198 This concern also lies behind
suggestions found in many of the bills that followed issuance of the
Grand Staircase-Escalante proclamation that Congress, as the
representative body in our system of government, should approve
monument designations before they become law.199
However, the Act’s supporters point out that there is sufficient
informal public participation in the process already—“rarely is a
national monument created without consultation between the
Department of the Interior, the White House, Congress, and state and
local representatives of the affected areas.”200 What’s more, the land-use
plans that govern management of national monuments undergo
“extensive public review” under NEPA and land management statutes,
like FLPMA and the Forest Service Organic Act.201
Indeed, information gathered through greater participation does not
automatically lead to more representative decisions. Most participants in
any planning process will probably represent special interests and will
speak the loudest because they are likely to have “the most at stake” in
any outcome, drowning out the less focused views of the general
Sanders, supra note 9, at 6; see also Squillace, supra note 25, at 583 (“It is
hardly surprising that some opponents of the law, recognizing that its repeal is
unlikely, have pressed to amend the law to include a cumbersome public process.
They understand that process can be used to delay, obfuscate, weaken, and perhaps
even defeat new proposals.”).
198
Sanders, supra note 9, at 5.
199
Id. See, e.g., S. 437, 114th Cong. (2015) (introduced by Sen. Lisa Murkowski
(R-AK) requiring an Act of Congress to designate a national monument, approval
of any states within the boundaries of a national monument—for marine national
monuments, states and territories within 100 nautical miles of the new monument
would have to consent to the designation). Maya Kapoor, With more monuments,
Republican backlash mounts: a proposed bill moves to weaken executive power of
the Antiquities Act, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jan. 13, 2017),
http://www.hcn.org/articles/with-more-monuments-Republican-backlashmounts/print_view.
200
Sanders, supra note 9, at 5.
201
Id; see also id. at 6 (saying that supporters argue the Antiquities Act is more
effective without extensive public review, which would hobble one of the few
environmental laws that work).
197
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public.202 Moreover, public participation in monument designation could
make that process unwieldy and cumbersome and actually chill the
interest in beginning the designation process.203
In terms of protecting the resource, supporters maintain that the
President’s representation of “the broad interests” of the American
public puts them in a better position “to make long term decisions about
the management of public lands,” than members of Congress and local
groups with their “narrower constituencies.”204 Saying that since
Congress is the representational body it is the better decision-maker in
these circumstances, is not by itself a compelling reason “because public
land resources necessarily must be managed for the long term.”205
In any event, Congress can abolish or “shrink” the boundaries of
national monuments and prevent their designation, as occurred in
Wyoming and Alaska.206 As an indication of congressional approval of
the Act and its use to protect important natural resources and structures,
Congress has converted many national monuments into national
parks,207 “and has never significantly amended or repealed the
202

Lin, supra note 17, at 741.
Squillace, supra note 25, at 572 (“Because a mandatory public process likely
would hamper the ability of future Presidents to use the Antiquities Act, adding
such a process would be a serious mistake.”); see also Jim Rossi, Participation Run
Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decision Making,
92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 179-80 (1997) (showing that participation is used
strategically to delay or to thwart agency programs, and not to engage in
democratic dialogue); Gail L. Achterman & Sally K. Fairfax, Public Participation
Requirements of the Federal Land Policy Management Act, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 501,
508 (1979) (“Moreover, ‘public involvement programs . . . may easily mobilize
dissent’ and heighten polarization, public frustration, and dissatisfaction”).
204
Sanders, supra note 9, at 6; see Lin, supra note 17, at 740 (“[W]ith respect to
accountability, the President is already directly accountable to majoritarian political
processes.”); id. at 746 (“[T]he President's distinction as the one leader elected by
all the American people places him in a unique position to exercise long-term and
broad-scale judgments regarding the national and historical significance of public
lands.”). This also makes the president accountable to the entire American public,
not just those who inhabit a member’s district or state.
205
Squillace, supra note 25, at 573-74.
206
Sanders, supra note 9, at 7.
207
See Lin, supra note 17, at 744 (“Congress has arguably recognized and endorsed
prior executives' farsighted and decisive wielding of Antiquities Act authority when
it converted numerous monuments to national parks.”); see also Sanders, supra
note 9, at 7 (“expressing anything but disapproval for how the Antiquities Act has
been implemented, Congress has turned many national monuments into national
203
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Antiquities Act, including in 1976 when it overhauled how the majority
of federal public lands were managed in FLPMA.”208 In fact, it
reaffirmed the importance of the Act in section 204(j).
Rasband characterizes the Antiquities Act “as a ‘gadget’ that
‘devalues the ennobling qualities of a fair and democratic preservation
process’ by circumventing the more difficult process of crafting
successful legislation.”209 Lin counters by saying “[t]he fact that both the
executive and legislative branches can exercise a similar power,
however, does not make the exercise by the former less democratic per
se, as long as that power has been democratically delegated and is
subject to democratic control.”210 He adds the congressional
acquiescence in the broad use of the Act’s authority creates an inference
of such delegation and control.211 According to Lin, “[i]n light of
Congress’ express and legitimate delegation of authority through the
Antiquities Act, the effectiveness of Congress’ checks on that authority,
and the political accountability of the wielder of that authority, the Act is
prima facie consistent with democratic principles.”212
Lin argues that the Antiquities Act “does not pose a serious threat to
the foundations of our democratic system,” and neither the concerns of
the “centralists,” who worry about power concentration, or the
“decentralists” who worry about power diffusion, “are seriously at
issue.”213 “Land withdrawn pursuant to the Act is essentially put in trust.
The means of protecting the land is both coercive and democraticcoercive because decisions are made in the absence of consensus and
perhaps without exhaustive public input; democratic because of the
multiple checks that ultimately provide accountability.”214 The Act’s
structure, thus, enables the popularly elected leader of the country “to
parks”). Today, lands that were initially withdrawn under the Antiquities Act
“comprise more than 50 percent of the total acreage” in the national park system.
208
Sanders, supra note 9, at 7; see also Lin, supra note 17, at 731
(“Notwithstanding the expansive use of the Act's authority, Congress has
repeatedly considered and rejected proposals to repeal or modify it.”).
209
Lin, supra note 17, at 730 (quoting Rasband, supra note 191, at 533).
210
Lin, supra note 17, at 731.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 730.
213
Id. at 744.
214
Id. (“‘[M]utual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people
affected,’ in its simplest form suggests an agreement among resource users to limit
use of a resource to protect it for continued future uses.”) (quoting WILLIAM
OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARY, 150-51 (1977).
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make resource-protective decisions subject to further debate and
disposition by the people’s elected representatives in Congress,”215
should they want to.
Still, on balance, the exclusion of the public from the Act’s formal
decision-making process is troubling and may resonate with a less
conservation-oriented Congress in the future, as is the case with the
current Congress. Whether informal public outreach, as was the case in
the designation of Bears Ears, will be sufficient to counter complaints
about the Act’s democracy deficit remains to be seen, as the final
chapter on that designation has yet to be written.
3. The Act destabilizes local expectations and fosters anti-federal
government feelings.
a. A landscape in transition and a history of anti-government
movements.
Many factors have made the Intermountain Western parts of the
country unique, not the least of which is the dominant presence of the
federal government. The federal government owns forty-seven percent
of the land in eleven western states; up to sixty-five percent in Utah--the
site of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monuments-and eighty-five percent in Nevada.216 Out of 157 national monuments
designated by Presidents, all but nineteen of them are located west of the
100th meridian, and sixty-four, nearly half of the total number of
designated monuments can be found in the Intermountain Western
states.217 Opponents view designation of national monuments as a
federal land grab,218 even though the federal government already owns
the designated lands, so the government is actually grabbing its own
land.219 And, national monuments cannot be made of private or state-

215

Id. at 746.
Sanders, supra note 9, at 3. Nationally, the federal government only owns 28%
of the land. Id.
217
Ranchod, supra note 10, at app. A at 585-88.
218
Sellars, supra note 8, at 295 (“[C]ritics of the Antiquities Act believed that the
monuments could take even more of the public domain out of the reach of private
ownership or use.”). The concern about locking up public lands was raised during
debates on the original statute and is anything but a modern plaint.
219
Lin, supra note 17, at 722 (“There was little substance to the ‘land grab’
charges, as the land in question already belonged to the federal government and
was therefore subject to disposition under the Property Clause.”).
216
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owned lands; only pre-existing federal lands.220
Whether it’s federal ownership of western lands or the intrusive
shadow of federal rules and regulations backed by the omnipotent
federal enforcement officer, westerners generally unite in their
opposition to the federal government.221 But the character of the western
landscape is changing catching rural communities “between powerful
forces of change.”222
In the West, “traditional economies are in decline, creating hardship,
dislocation, and no small amount of desperation among long-time
residents.”223 The “economic dislocation” this part of the country is
experiencing is “‘more widespread [and] more persistent’ then it has
been in the past.”224 Changes in the national economy have put “small,
marginally successful users of public resources,” like ranchers, at a
competitive disadvantage with larger, diversified corporations, shifting
“the economies of many western states” away from these businesses
toward recreation and tourism.225 “Recent world economic trends do not
220

Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 2. There can be exceptions to this where
private or local land is donated to the federal government. See id. at 9 (in
possession of author) (discussing the designation of the Mount Katahdin Woods
and Waters National Monument on lands donated by the owner of Burt’s Bees, and
saying “[o]ther National Monuments established under the Antiquities Act stand on
a different footing because they were established in concert with a city, State or
private citizen or organization which owned the land and gave it to the federal
government on the condition that it be included in a National Monument. If such a
Monument designation were revoked, one can only imagine the chaos that would
result, at least absent federal legislation, in terms of the disposition of the land and
rights so contributed. But only Congress has the power to do so.”).
221
Rasband, supra note 191, at 857-58 (quoting Bruce Babbitt, Federalism & the
Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12
ENVTL. L. 847, 857-58 (1982) (“What angers most westerners is not the fact of
federal ownership, but the federal government's insistence that it is entitled to
exercise power ‘without limitation.’ When this sovereign power is wielded by a
continually changing parade of federal administrators, each with a different agenda,
the situation becomes intolerable.”).
222
Bill Hedden, The Monument in a Changing West, 21 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 535, 535 (2001).
223
Id.
224
Robert L. Glicksman, Fear and Loathing on Federal Lands, 45 U. KAN. L. REV.
647, 665 (1997).
225
Id.; see also HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, supra note 157, at 1 (reporting that 44%
of total private wage and salary employment, the equivalent of 1,630 jobs, were
associated with travel and tourism in Utah and that, according to the Outdoor
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favor family ranching. Declining per capita beef consumption, overseas
competition, and consolidation of packing houses have driven beef
prices down at the same time that ranchers, who depend on federal
grazing leases, face an increasingly complex regulatory environment
that raises operating costs and increases uncertainty.” 226 Indeed, long
before designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument. Traditional jobs like agriculture, mining, and timber “were
becoming a smaller share of the overall economy, but they held steady
after the monument’s designation.”227
Today, government services, mining, and construction are the
principal income-producers in San Juan County, the location of the
controversial Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante national
monuments. 228 The federal government is still the top employer in the
country,229 which is not surprising as the federal government owns 60%
of the land in the county.230 The public reaction to the recent designation
of these two monuments in the county may reflect “a new reality in
which the economic benefits of recreation on the public lands exceed
economic benefits of alternative uses.”231 Illustrating this change, a
January 2017 poll of Utah residents showed that sixty percent of
respondents wanted the designations to remain and that ninety-five
percent recognized that opportunities for outdoor recreation at national
parks in Utah were a “boon” to the state, in 2015 generating nearly $850
million per year in visitor spending and creating 14,000 jobs that paid
$435 million.232
Industry Association, recreation contributes more that $12 billion annually to the
state’s economy).
226
Hedden, supra note 222, at 539; see also Glicksman, supra note 224, at 665
(“The West, surprisingly, is now the most urbanized scion of the country, and
traditional industries such as farming, mining, ranching, and logging contribute less
to state economies than they used to.”).
227
HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, supra note 157, at 12.
228
Julie Turkevitz, A Vast Divide: Fight Intensifies as Trump Rethinks Monument
Status for Utah Expanse, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2017, at A11; see also Headwaters
Economics, supra note 157, at 1 (service jobs in the Grand Staircase-Escalante
region “account for the majority of employment growth”); see also id. (from 20012015 in that region, population grew by 13%, jobs by 24%, real personal income by
32%, and real per capita income by 17%).
229
Hedden, supra note 222, at 537.
230
Turkevitz, supra note 228, at A11.
231
Lin, supra note 17, at 724.
232
Darryl Fears, Bears Ears is a national monument now. But it will take a fight to
save it, WASHINGTON POST, Mar 23, 2017,
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But a shifting regional economy has not caught up with the antifederal government feelings of the residents, and indeed may be
provoking them. “Rebelling against government has been in the hearts
of the ordinary American citizens ever since Colonial days,”233 and in no
place is that more true than the Intermountain West perhaps because of
these changes to the area’s economic and social equilibrium.234 The area
has gone through a succession of anti-federal government movements,
like the Sagebrush Rebellion,235 the Wise Use Movement,236 and now
the County Supremacy Movement.
The Wise Use Movement focused on the threats posed to western
communities by environmentalists and the need for stronger protection
of private property rights. “Their goal, like that of the Sagebrush Rebels
before them, was the transfer of undeveloped western federal lands to
the private sector for commercial exploitation.”237 The County
Supremacy Movement, the latest iteration of the Sagebrush Rebellion,
“was born in Catron County, New Mexico, which in 1991 passed the
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/bears-ears-is-a-national-monument-nowbut-it-will-take-a-fight-to-save-it (noting the importance of the $1.3 billion
economic impact of parks and monuments, during the 2013 government shutdown,
the state “paid the Park Service to keep them open.”).
233
Reed, supra note 127, at 530.
234
Glicksman, supra note 224, at 665 (historian Eric Hobsbawm describes a
particular form of rural social unrest, which he calls social banditry, as ‘most likely
to become a major phenomenon when the . . . social equilibrium is upset: during
and after periods of abnormal hardship, such as famines and wars, or at the
moments when the jaws of the dynamic modem world seize the static communities
in order to destroy and transform them.’”).
235
Id. at 652 (“The forerunner of the claims by the officials of Nye County, Nevada
and Garfield County, Utah that they had the right to control activities on the federal
lands was the Sagebrush Rebellion of the mid-1970s. Led by western ranching
interests opposed to increased federal land use regulation, the rebels sought the
transfer of title to millions of acres of federal lands to the states containing them . . .
by the mid-1980s, the rebellion had fizzled out.”). See Eisenberg, supra note 185,
at 63 n.34 (quoting former Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt as saying “It is easy to
dismiss the motives of the small group of stockmen and their political allies who
have revived the rallying cry of states’ rights for their own benefit. But the
considerable support that the Sagebrush Rebellion has gained in the West reflects a
deep-seated frustration with what is perceived to be heavy-handed, arbitrary, and
unreasonable federal regulation of public lands.”).
236
Glicksman, supra note 224, at 653 (“The successor to the Sagebrush Rebellion
was the Wise Use Movement, born around 1988 in reaction to the increased
emphasis placed on preservation of federal lands and resources.”).
237
Id. at 653.
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first so-called ‘custom and culture’ ordinance.”238 Supporters of these
ordinances maintain that their intent is to foster “the ‘American tradition
of self-government’ by reducing bureaucracy and increasing economic
stability.”239 Glicksman maintains that once the rhetoric of the County
Supremacy movement and its focus on culture and custom is “stripped
away,” the movement is all about rejecting change and maintaining
“traditional access rights and prerogatives.”240 Regardless of how these
groups self-describe, “it is difficult to distinguish the objective sought in
Catron County from the nullification, not of all federal laws, but of those
federal policies plans and practices related to land, water and wildlife
which were not to the liking of the county government.”241
The County Supremacy Movement, like its predecessor movements,
is built on myth. There are no laws at the federal or even state level
requiring deference to custom and culture, despite the passage of
“custom and culture” ordinances, discussed above. As Reed says, the
theory “teeters upon the slenderest of reeds”242 Reed adds that “[t]he
county supremacy ordinances have the durability of cow chips,” and the
concept of county supremacy is little more than “a gaseous myth,” to
which westerners seem to be especially susceptible.243 But that does not
Id. at 654; see also id. at 656 (“The Kleppe decision [Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426
U.S. 529 (1976)] should have put an end to the spurious notion that state or local
governments have the right to dictate how the federal government may use and
restrict its own lands. But the County Supremacists and their ideological kindred
continue to press their claims which, despite refinements, still fly in the face of
precedent.”).
239
Id. at 660. But see Reed, supra note 127 (quoting Bill Welsch of Lewiston, in
Trinity County in northern California, as saying that “an honest search to discover
the local custom and culture would produce something different: ‘The custom of
our past is to seize land by force from the natives, plunder the resources using slave
and child labor, wash away land with hydraulic mining and clear-cut virgin
forests.’”).
240
Glicksman, supra note 224, at 666. Reporting on the comments by a senior
fellow at the Cato Institute, a conservative think tank located in Washington, D.C.,
Glicksman says he described the supporters of the County Supremacy Movement
as wanting to do is “build walls against the future.” Id. Glicksman identifies
another “prominent theme in the recent movement to reform environmental
policy,” namely that federal regulatory authority infringes of private property
rights. Id. at 660. But see Eisenberg, supra note 185, at 65 (identifying three
“colorable claims” made by these groups “justifying local outrage”).
241
Reed, supra note 127, at 543.
242
Id. at 526.
243
Id.
238

CONVERTDOC.INPUT.593072.DSQ9K (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

RESCISSION OF A DESIGNATED MONUMENT

1/17/2018 10:44 PM

147

matter to its participants; according to Reed, “it is folly to underestimate
the political power of myths.”244
One striking aspect of the County Supremacy movement that
separates it from the groups that preceded it is the strength of the
hostility to the federal presence and a “willingness” to resort to extreme,
sometimes violent behavior, an attitude that has not yet infected the
debates about reforming pollution control laws.245 This violence,
Glicksman says, is attributable to another unique feature of western
culture, “the tradition of lawlessness in the West,” a tradition based in
part on reality and in part on “myth.”246 “Diatribes” like those emanating
from a Congresswoman from Wyoming, that the West was not settled by
“wimps and faint-hearted people,”247 “have been enthusiastically
received in some corners of the West because of a combination of
resentment over the disappearance of longstanding traditions and
practices and fear of what the future will bring.”248 In this mix of anger
and anxiety, the federal government becomes “a convenient scapegoat”
for the repressed frustrations of a regional population undergoing
unwanted and destabilizing change.249
Another important strand of western thinking that plays into these
movements is the “tradition of subjugating nature,”250 which has
encouraged the building of dams, making money and “packing in more
people,” regardless of the environmental and societal costs. At “a very
deep level,” conflicts over monument designations, like Grand StaircaseEscalante and Bears Ears, “are rooted in the divergent moral and cultural
values that generate differing views of the relationship between humans
and nature.”251 Hence, the withdrawal of lands that have traditionally
244

Id.
Glicksman, supra note 224, at 661. Glicksman cites as an example of this
President Clinton and Interior Secretary Babbitt being burned in effigy. Id at 666.
246
Id. at 661.
247
141 CONG. REC. H8789, H8790 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1995 (remarks of Rep.
Chenoweth)), quoted in Glicksman, supra note 224, at 664.
248
Glicksman, supra note 224, at 664.
249
Id.
250
Id. at 663 (attributing these thoughts to DONALD WORSTER, UNDER WESTERN
SKIES: NATURE AND HISTORY IN THE AMERICAN WEST 90 (1992)).
251
Sarah Trainor, Finding Common Ground: Moral Values and Cultural Identify in
Early Conflict Over the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, 28 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 331, 355 (2008); see also id. at 354 (“We have seen
how for each group: the Southern Paiute, descendants of Mormon pioneers, and
wilderness advocates, moral and cultural values of the landscape constitute an
integral part of the identity of group members, both individually and collectively.
245
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been exploited for mining, oil and gas development, and grazing is
unfathomable to traditionalists in the west and deeply threatening to
established ways of living.
Traditions and engrained attitudes die hard and in the designation of
national monuments have found an opportune target.
There is a stream, that sometimes widens into a river, flowing through
our history from the Whiskey Rebellion through the Know Nothing
movement to the Populists to Ross Perot. The best government is the
least government. The next best government is local government.
Those people back there don’t understand our territory or our ways.252

In 2012, for example, Utah passed a law demanding that the federal
government hand over thirty-one million acres of federal lands, and the
state is ready to go to court if the government does not accede to the
demand.253 “Thirty-six similar bills have been introduced in 10 other
western states during the current legislative cycle.”254 As Sanders notes,
one “can dismiss the Oregon standoff as fringe activism, and the land
transfer movement as wishful thinking, but they are emblematic of a
long-running and very real debate over the proper role of the federal
Yet, each group has a different cultural and moral narrative for the relationship
between humans and nature.”); id. at 355 (The conflict over monument
designations “is incomplete and oversimplified when characterized as conflict over
jobs versus nature or over private versus public rights to access.”).
252
Reed, supra note 127, at 530; see also id. at 530 (“Even in times of very popular
presidents . . . there have always been strident dissenters complaining about the
federal government.”).
253
Sanders, supra note 9, at 3. Ironically, Utah has the strongest support for
federal-state collaborative efforts of any state in the Intermountain West, “with
respondents favoring collaboration outnumbering those who favor a ‘no
compromise’ approach by an eleven to one margin.” John C. Ruoke & Robert B.
Keiter, Alternatives to the Transfer of Public Lands Act, S.J. Quinney College of
Law, RES. PAPER No. 157 (March 1, 2016), at 9.
254
Sanders, supra note 9, at 3. Eight members of Congress who introduced
legislation this session to weaken public lands protections also received “hefty
campaign contributions from powerful players in extractive industries, such as
Koch Industries and Chevron.” Rebecca Worby et al., Eight Lawmakers Whose
Bills Attack Public Lands, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, June 10, 2017, at 1,
http://www.hcn.org/issues/49.10/the-western-lawmakers-whose-bills-attack-publiclands/print_view. However, retiring senator Jason Chaffetz (R. Utah) withdrew his
bill to sell 3.3 million acres of public lands in Utah in response to “backlash” from
his constituents. Id.
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government in owning and managing American lands.”255 Many of the
earlier advocates of transferring federal land to the states have shifted
their efforts to nullifying national monuments and restricting presidential
authority under the Antiquities Act; Bears Ears has become the
flashpoint of that debate.256
b. The destabilizing impact of monument designation on host
communities.
Monument designations disrupt the expectations of people who are
used to using public lands as though they, and not the American people,
owned them.257 They worry that the withdrawal of lands into a more
protected status will curtail largely unregulated uses of these lands for
recreation as well as grazing and extractive activities, thus changing how
people are accustomed to conducting their lives. They fear economic
harm to individuals, local communities, and the state.258 Designation
Sanders, supra note 9, at 3; see also id. (“The Malheur standoff and the state
land transfer movement will join the Sagebrush Rebellion of the 1970s and 1980s,
and the ‘wise use’ movement of the 1980s and 1990s, as manifestations of the
fractious dispute among ranchers, loggers, miners, private property activists,
conservationists, federal land managers, and others about how best to manage our
nation’s federal public lands.”); Eisenberg, supra note 185, at 56 (“supporters
of . . . the Movement to Transfer Public Lands, encompassing such sub-movements
as the Sagebrush Rebellion, the Wise Use Movement, and the County Supremacy
Move—all maintain some version of the narrative that federal ownership is illegal
or mismanaged, and thus the land should be transferred to the states or counties, or
privatized outright.”).
256
Tay Wiles, Land transfer advocates steer their focus to monuments: A transfer
movement moves to rescind monuments and weaken the Antiquities Act, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (Apr. 12, 2017), at 1, http://www.hcn.org/articles/Public-landtransfer-advocates-target-national-monuments-bears-ears/print_view. Six Western
states, including Utah, have pending resolutions or bills to revoke or shrink the size
of national monuments. Id. at 2. Sen. Dean Heller of Nevada sponsored the Nevada
Land Sovereignty Act, which would prevent future presidents from using the
Antiquities Act to designate monuments in that state. Id. at 3. Utah Governor
Herbert’s resolution would rescind Bears Ears and urge Congress to shrink Grand
Staircase-Escalante. There is also a counter-movement among environmentalists
and sportsmen, which may have been responsible for Nevada legislators discussing
a bill to support the Antiquities Act and the Gold Butte and Great Basin National
Monuments. Id. at 4
257
Lin, supra note 17, at 722.
258
See Lin, supra note 17, at 724 (“Nevertheless, even if effects on such interests
ultimately do not give rise to takings, the monument designations admittedly have
adverse economic impacts on certain users of the federal lands.”); Sanders, supra
255
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could result in an emigration of residents who can no longer make a
living in the area or who cannot afford the higher taxes which may
accompany increased property values, and greater need for public
service like law enforcement or search and rescue units. Existing
residents worry that the influx of tourists and new businesses drawn to
the area by the new monuments will demand non-traditional skills, like
those associated with service and hospitality industries, and will destroy
the rural character that has defined the area and its population for
generations.259
But fears about discontinuation of traditional uses of lands within
the boundaries of a national monument are not well founded. These
lands are subject to management standards, which can allow most of
these existing uses to go forward.260 National Parks, monuments, and
other protected areas attract visitors, who spend money in the
surrounding communities;261 money that will support new schools and
additional public service obligations.262 Right before President Clinton
designated Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in 1996, 47%
of Utahans opposed its creation.”263 Half a year later, that number had
sunk to 32%.264 A year after the designation, “the number of tourists
stopping by the visitor center had jumped by 58%, and ten years later,
they and the monument’s 430 full-time jobs were contributing at least
$26 million to the local economy.”265
note 9, at 6 (“Regarding economic impacts, critics contend that monuments, by
restricting allowable uses, destroy long-established enterprises on public lands. The
effects can be especially severe in the remote places in the West where most
monuments are created and job opportunities are few. President Clinton’s 1996
Grand Staircase-Escalante Monument sequestered what was then the largest
undeveloped coal deposit in the United States, while the national monument
reportedly being considered for the Owyhee Canyonlands (which helped precipitate
the recent standoff at the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon) could close
nearly 2.5 million acres to cattle grazing.”).
259
Lin, supra note 17, at 724-25.
260
Squillace, supra note 25, at 573-74 (noting that valid existing rights and
proclamations that allow new land uses, even extractive ones to continue means
that “the temporary protection of these lands and resources in a national monument
preserves, rather than limits, the options available to the Congress in deciding on
the long-term management of those lands.”).
261
Sanders, supra note 9, at 6.
262
See e.g., HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, supra note 152 at 26 n.160.
263
Sanders, supra note 9, at 6.
264
Id.
265
Id.
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Thus, national monuments “don’t kill local economies and jobs so
much as transform them”266 from traditional uses to new ones and help
preserve the existing landscape. As Alan Simpson, a longtime
Republican Senator from Wyoming, said about the Jackson Hole
National Monument:
All of us [those who now live in Jackson Hole] agree that Teton
County would not look like it does today if they hadn’t (established the
monument and expanded the park). Instead of open space there would
be gas stations, motels and other businesses on Antelope Flats north of
Jackson where the view of the Tetons remains largely unobstructed by
development. It was great in hindsight.267

But that transformation is part of the problem for traditionalists,
which has found new voice in response to recent designations of
national monuments.
This Part has shown how little merit there is to the arguments raised
by opponents of the Antiquities Act and of specific monument
designations like Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Escalante. Legal
plaints against the statute under the Property Clause, the APA, and
NEPA have little merit, and while the law is short on public
participation, Congress has seen fit not to amend it to correct this
democracy deficit. In fact, more process and public participation might
hinder future designations, thus undermining the Act’s purpose.
Finally, fears that designation of national monuments would
negatively affect the economies of host communities turns out not to be
true—quite the contrary, those economies improve post-designation.
What is true, however, is that these designations are occurring during a
time and in a part of the country where change is already occurring, and
that itself is destabilizing and a source of animosity to the federal
government as well as to federal lands, including national monuments.
The next Part discusses a sitting President’s authority to revoke, directly
or indirectly, a prior President’s designation of a national monument.

266

Id.
Squillace, supra note 25, at 498 n.159 (quoting former Senator Alan K.
Simpson, previously a strident opponent to the Jackson Hole National Monument).
As another indication of the monument’s contribution to local life and the area’s
economy, Congress made it into a National Park in 1950. Leshy & Squillace, supra
note 8, at A23.
267
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IV. NEITHER THE TEXT OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT NOR INTERPRETIVE
CANONS AUTHORIZE A PRESIDENT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO
REVOKE OR AMEND A PRIOR PRESIDENT’S DESIGNATION OF A
NATIONAL MONUMENT
What counts as an abuse of executive discretion, and how best to try to
prevent those abuses through law, extralegal norms, or politics, will
remain among the most pressing questions at the center of
constitutional governance in the United States.268

The previous Part of the article looked at arguments opposing and
supporting the Antiquities Act and concerns the designation of a national
monument creates in a host community. This Part examines the
authority of a President to override a decision of a prior President to
designate a national monument when he does not like that decision.
Some say this authority inheres within the general powers of the
President; others disagree. Like any question involving a statute and
authority delegated under it,269 the answers, if they can be found, lie in
statutory text, as elucidated by canons of statutory interpretation, the
Act’s legislative history, and the text’s application by others, including
subsequent congressional action. It is to these analytical tools the Article
now turns to answer the Part’s question.
Since prior sections of the article have discussed the Act’s
legislative history, its application by prior Presidents, and how courts
have interpreted it, this section will focus on the statutory text and its
reaffirmation in FLPMA, on whether the President might have an
implied power to affect a national monument, and on canons of statutory
interpretation. The Part concludes that only Congress has the power to
affect a previously designated national monument, and that all contrary
conclusions based on statutory text, interpretive canons, and implied
powers fail to support the President having this power. To cede to
Presidents this power in defiance of statutory text would defy norms of
separation of powers and delegated authority, as discussed in the last
Part of the Article.
A. Section 204(j) of FLPMA Reaffirmed the Textual Clarity of Section
268

Coglianese & Yoo, supra note 162, at 1606.
Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 1 (“Whether or not the President has the
power unilaterally to revoke a National Monument designation therefore depends
on whether that power is expressly or by implication delegated to the President by
an Act of Congress.”).
269
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431 of the Antiquities Act that Only Congress Can Rescind a National
Monument or Modify its Boundaries
The statutory text of section 431 of the Antiquities Act gives the
President only the power to identify and then protect historical and prehistorical structures and objects of scientific interest. The Act gives no
authority to the President to rescind or “de-designate” a designated
national monument, shrink its boundaries, or change any conditions in
the designation proclamation. Those powers to revoke or amend a
presidential designation reside only in Congress and implicitly in the
courts, if the Presidential designation violates the Act in some way. No
judicial decision could be found authorizing a President to do either,270
and no canon of statutory interpretation or other interpretive trope can
force a contrary meaning to the text.
Congress affirmed its authority to revoke or modify national
monuments in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)
(1976).271 FLPMA was preceded by a 1964 congressional commission
which recommended that “large scale withdrawals and reservations for
the purpose [among other things] of establishing or enlarging” national
monuments “should be reserved to congressional action.”272 The House
Report on FLPMA “made clear that . . . [i]t would also specially reserve
to the Congress the authority to modify and revoke withdrawals for
national monuments created under the Antiquities Act . . . . These
provisions will insure that the integrity of the great national resource
management systems will remain under the control of the Congress.” 273
The House Committee Report, thus, specifically reiterated that only
BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 3 (“We have found no cases deciding the issue of
the authority of a President to revoke a national monument. While in FLPMA
Congress expressly limited the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to revoke
monument withdrawals and reservations, that language arguably does not affect the
President's authority under the 1906 Act, which FLPMA neither amended nor
repealed. No President has ever revoked a previously established monument. That a
President can modify a previous Presidentially-created monument seems clear.
However, there is no language in the 1906 Act that expressly authorizes revocation;
there is no instance of past practice in that regard, and there is an attorney general's
opinion concluding that the President lacks that authority.”).
271
“Establishing Public Land Policy; Establishing Guidelines for its Administration;
Providing for the Management, Protection, Development, and Enhancement of the
Public Lands; and For Other Purposes,” H. R. REP. 94-1163 (1976) (hereafter the
“House Report”) at 9.
272
Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 4 (quoting Commission report).
273
Id. at 6 (quoting House Report, at 9).
270
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Congress had “the authority to modify and revoke withdrawals for
national monuments under the Antiquities Act.”274
FLPMA repealed most of the President and Secretary of Interior’s
land withdrawal authority275 and subjected future withdrawals to
additional congressional scrutiny and approval.276 “FLPMA additionally
repealed the implied general withdrawal authority that had been
recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Midwest Oil.”277
Amidst all this repealing and cabining of Secretarial withdrawal
authority, FLPMA specified in section 204(j) that the Secretary of
Interior “could not make, modify, or revoke any withdrawal created by
Act of Congress or ‘modify or revoke any withdrawal creating national
monuments under the Act of June 8, 1906 (34 Stat. 225; 16 U.S.C. 431433).”278
While section 204(j) refers to the Secretary’s authority to withdraw
land and not the President, “the breadth of the committee report
language” supporting the legislation indicates that Congress could have
thought that preventing the Secretary from affecting any previously
designated national monument would, in effect, control a President from
doing the same thing.279 “Whether this is a fair reading of FLPMA and
274

Id. at 1-2.
Lin, supra note 17, at 710 (“The 1976 passage of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA) drastically curbed and modified the executive branch's
withdrawal authority. FLPMA repealed all or part of twenty-nine statutes that had
given the President authority to create, modify, or terminate withdrawals for such
purposes as reclamation, native purposes, power site reserves, town sites, stock
driveways, and public water reserves.”).
276
BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 2; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c) (2014).
277
Lin, supra note 17, at 710 (commenting in addition Congress noted that this
implied authority was the main authority that the executive branch had used to
make withdrawals).
278
43 U.S.C. § 1714(j) (2014). Section 204(j) also prohibited the Secretary to
“make, modify or revoke any withdrawal created by Act of Congress” or “modify
or revoke any withdrawal which added lands to the National Wildlife Refuge
System” prior to the enactment date of FLPMA; see also BALDWIN, supra note 21,
at 2. According to Baldwin, this “provision came from the House bill, H.R. 13777,
as introduced and as reported. The relevant committee report states: ‘[the bill]
would also specifically reserve to Congress the authority to modify and revoke
withdrawals for national monuments created under the Antiquities Act . . . These
provisions will insure that the integrity of the great national resource management
systems will remain under the control of the Congress.’” Id. at 4.
279
BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 5 (one might “argue that the general controls in
FLPMA over large withdrawals made by the Secretary were also intended to
275
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whether controlling withdrawals or revocations made by the Secretary
effectively controls the President under the Antiquities Act are issues
that are not clear.”280 What is clear is that although FLPMA gave the
Secretary of the Interior some authority to withdraw public lands, it
specifically stated that he could not revoke or modify in any way a
previously designated national monument under the Antiquities Act.281
In section 204(c) of FLPMA, Congress reasserted its control over
withdrawals and reservations of public lands and limited actions that
could be taken by the President or by his surrogate the Secretary of the
Interior with respect to those lands.282 It did this by requiring
congressional approval of large land withdrawals and repealing earlier
laws, which gave that authority to the President. In section 204(f),
Congress repealed the President’s authority “to make withdrawals
implied by the acquiescence of Congress in the actions of previous
Presidents.”283 However, amidst all of this taking back of Presidential
power over the nation’s lands, Congress in FLPMA “conspicuously”
retained the President’s authority under the Antiquities Act to designate
national monuments and withdraw land necessary for their maintenance,
without any explanation of why it made that decision, implying some
control withdrawals made by the President under the 1906 Act.”); see also
Squillace et al., supra note 5, at 60-64 (discussing the legislative history of § 204(j)
making it clear that only Congress possesses the authority to revoke or “downsize”
a national monument).
280
BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 3. Brown argues against construing this report
language as repealing the authority of the President to make large scale withdrawals
“because courts are reluctant to find statutes repealed by implication and this would
seem especially true of a statute that so carefully and extensively repealed or
modified so many other acts, but did not amend or repeal the Antiquities Act.” Id.
Indeed, uncodified section 701 (a) of FLPMA expressly states that the Act should
not be construed to repeal any existing law by implication, and Presidents have
created large-acreage monuments since enactment of FLPMA.” Id.
281
Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 6 citing 43 U.S.C. § 1714; see also BALDWIN,
supra note 21, at 3 (quoting the report as saying “[the bill] would also specifically
reserve to Congress the authority to modify and revoke withdrawals for national
monuments created under the Antiquities Act . . . These provisions will insure that
the integrity of the great national resource management systems will remain under
the control of the Congress.”).
282
BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 3; see also Lin, supra note 17, at 711 (“FLPMA
provided to the Secretary of the Interior a new, more limited withdrawal authority
and subjected it to congressional veto and other procedural restrictions. This
authority cannot be used to modify or revoke a withdrawal previously made by
Congress, or to make withdrawals ‘which can be made only by Act of Congress.’”).
283
See Sec. 304(f), 43 U.S.C. §1714(f); see also BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 3.
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obviousness to the choice.284
B. Interpretive Canons and Other Forms of Guidance on Statutory
Meaning Are Either Irrelevant or Confirm a Limited View of
Presidential Authority under the Act
“[T]he body of the law should make sense, and . . . it is the
responsibility of courts, within the permissible meanings of the text, to
make it so.”285 Toward this end, when there is textual ambiguity, courts
often use interpretive canons or other rules to help clarify statutory
meaning. Canons are basically “interpretive principles” judges use when
faced with ambiguous statutory text.286 Despite some unease with their
use,287 canons and interpretive principles are easy for judges to apply
and help assure some coherence and consistency in judicial decision
making.288 In addition to canons, courts use presumptions and legislative
history to help “resolve statutory ambiguity.”289
Gluck and Bressman divide interpretive canons into three groups:
(1) “‘textual canons,’ which are default rules about how text is drafted,”
like noscitur a sociis; (2) “‘substantive canons,’ which are policy-based
presumptions,” like Chevron deference; and (3) “‘extrinsic canons,’
which are outside sources, such as legislative history.” 290 There are also
clear statement rules, which imply that drafters use what Gluck and
Bressman call ‘magic words’ to achieve an interpretation that may
contradict a constitutional default rule, citing as an example the rule
BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 1; see also Lin, supra note 17, at 711 (“FLPMA’s
sweeping changes, however, did not affect the President’s withdrawal authority
under the Antiquities Act.”).
285
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside-an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 961 (2013) (quoting former Justice Antonin Scalia).
286
Id. at 924.
287
Id. at 1019 (“The canons provide at least a veneer of legitimacy by allowing
judges to point to something other than their own personal preferences or intuitions
to justify their decisions. At the same time, the legitimacy of the canons themselves
is a cause for discomfort. Judges, and even scholars, seem reluctant to discuss more
frankly where the canons come from and whether at least some are necessarily
judicial creations rather than reflections of legislative intent or practice.”).
288
Id. at 925; see also id. at 961 (such canons derive their most powerful
justification from ‘rule of law’ norms-the idea that interpretive rules should
coordinate systemic behavior or impose coherence on the corpus juris.”).
289
Id. at 924.
290
Id. at 924-25.
284
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requiring “‘unmistakably clear’ language that Congress intends to
abrogate the states’ immunity from suits before a statute will be so
construed.”291 Then there is the major questions doctrine, which
“supports a presumption of nondelegation in the face of statutory
ambiguity over major policy questions or questions of major political or
economic significance on the theory, as Justice Scalia has memorably
described it, that Congress ‘does not . . . hide elephants in mouse
holes’”292 And finally the “constitutional avoidance” rule, favoring an
interpretation of a statute that comports with the Constitution.293
The only textual canon of any possible relevance with respect to the
meaning of section 431 of the Antiquities Act is expressio unius
(presence of one term in the statutory text implies a deliberate exclusion
of any other terms).294 This canon “instructs that when a legal instrument
grants a power and specifies the mode of its implementation, interpreters
should treat the specified mode as exclusive.”295 The rule is
commonsensical—”a lawmaker would not take pains to prescribe
particular means of carrying out a power if other methods would do.”296
Thus, when Congress specifically gave affirmative authority to the
President under the Antiquities Act to protect structures and objects of
historical and scientific interest and withdraw associated land for their
Id. at 942. “In addition there are ‘nearly a dozen’ administrative law canons. The
spectrum extends from Chevron, which presumes that Congress intends to delegate
interpretive authority to an agency whenever it leaves an ambiguity in a statute that
the agency implements; to Mead, which presumes that Congress does not intend to
delegate interpretive authority without the authorization of relatively formal
procedures (such as notice-and-comment rulemaking); to the ‘major questions’
doctrine, which presumes that Congress does not intend to delegate interpretive
authority over major policy questions to an agency, even if it leaves a statutory
ambiguity.” Id. at 990.
292
Id. at 1003.
293
Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President to Do? Interpreting the Constitution in
the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395, 406 (2008)
(commenting on President Bush’s use of that canon and saying “President Bush's
objections typically took the form of a declaration that he would use the canon of
statutory construction known as constitutional avoidance to interpret the statute in a
constitutional manner—but that ‘[a]s a practical matter, this form of interpretation
amounts to the same thing as an assertion that the President will not enforce or be
bound by a particular provision of law.’”).
294
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 285, at 924.
295
Jack Goldsmith & John Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 1835, 1859 (2016).
296
Id.
291
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management, but withheld any power to do more, like revoke a
previously designated monument or change its boundaries, courts and
Presidents should treat that authority as exclusive.
None of the other textual, substantive, or extrinsic canons supports a
contrary interpretation of the President’s limited authority under the
Anquities Act are of any help. There is no list of terms in section 431 to
which noscitur a sociis could apply, what legislative history there is
supports a sharply curtailed grant of authority to the President to
designate and protect monuments, not to rescind or amend prior
designation, and neither the clear statement rule nor major questions
doctrines is relevant, as no abrogation of power or diminution in state
authority is involved in withdrawing and protecting land that already
belongs to the federal government. Nor are there major policy questions
or questions of major political or economic import involved in a
designation of a national monument as the effects, to the extent they are
negative, are highly localized.
Indeed, no canon of statutory interpretation or interpretive rule or
doctrine can read into the text of the Antiquities Act a presidential
authority to rescind or modify a previously declared national monument
because there is no textual ambiguity on that issue. 297 Even if there was
ambiguity, there are no external signals, such as longstanding
interpretations of the statutory language, legislative history directives,
and “linguistic signaling,” which would reveal a congressional intent to
delegate this authority to the President.298 Quite the contrary, the
designation of 157 monuments by sixteen Presidents of both political
parties, as well as affirming judicial opinions and congressional action,
make it clear that the President possesses only delegated authority to
designate and protect monuments, not to rescind or amend their
designation. And any question raised in the legislative history of section
431 about a presidential power to revoke or modify a previously
designated national monument was firmly laid to rest in section 204(j) of
FLPMA, which, as discussed previously, strongly implies Congress
reserved that authority to itself and not the President.299 Any
297

But see Gluck & Bressman, supra note 285, at 1013 (referring to court review
under the Chevron doctrine and saying,“[c]ourts currently consider the relative
clarity of the text at Step One, but our findings indicate that textual clarity is not
always a reliable signal of delegation. As an initial matter, courts often look to
textual and substantive canons as indications of congressional intent in deciding
whether statutory text is clear.”).
298
Id.
299
See above, Part IV.A.
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interpretation of section 431 to the contrary would countenance “a
usurpation of congressional powers by the Executive Branch,”300 as
discussed in Part V.A.
An additional limit on executive discretion are so-called unwritten,
but nonetheless “obligatory rules of the political game.”301 Vermeule
divides politics into “two critically different subcategories: ordinary
contingent politics and moralized politics, in which there are widely
shared unwritten rules of the political game.”302 With regard to the
second category, moralized politics, rules regarding them “are founded
on a sense of obligation, and a public act violating the rules provokes
retaliatory sanctions or moralized outrage.”303
Thus, it is conceivable that if President Trump changed the rules of
the game and exercised a power he does not have, like revoking the prior
designation of a national monument or shrinking its boundaries, he
might enrage supporters of that monument who, feeling morally
wronged, might seek retaliatory sanctions against the President in court
or in Congress. The resultant political backlash or public anger of the
people most affected when a convention is transgressed may occur even
if the underlying law is not violated,304 which it clearly would be in this

300

Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 2; see also Rasband, supra note 191, at 62930 (“there is no question of Congress' power to revoke or modify a national
monument designation. Congress has plenary power over the public lands under the
Property Clause and Congress has abolished a number of monuments in the past,
although typically only to include the monument lands within a national park
instead.”).
301
Vermeule, supra note 190, at 1949.
302
Id. at 1955-56.
303
Id.; see also id. at 1956 (“[C]onventions may, but need not, be based upon the
force of ‘public opinion.’”). “Wayne Aspinall of Colorado, the powerful chair of
the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, that Aspinall blocked funding
for the C&O Canal National Monument for many years. Aspinall's action, like the
action of an earlier Congress with respect to the Jackson Hole National Monument,
served as a continuing warning to future presidents that national monument
proclamations under the Antiquities Act carried risks. A President might be able to
preserve the status quo on public lands through a monument proclamation, but he
might be denied the money that was needed to protect the monument's resources.”
Squillace, supra note 25, at 500.
304
Vermeule, supra note 190, at 1959 (“There exists a category of executive
discretion such that the Executive may do things without violating any law or
convention, but will violate a convention, triggering political backlash or public
outrage, if the Executive makes explicit that he or she is doing those things. Some
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case, making the reaction still more justified. “Politicians believe—with
good reason—that the American public cares about the law and will
punish a President who flouts it.”305 This is especially true when the
result of a President’s actions is not perceived as good306 or the
President’s actions are driven by political motives, 307 as arguably might
be the case here as the President seeks to shore up his political base in
the Intermountain West.308
Even if a limited right of Presidents to act on their own without
congressional support was viewed as legitimate, for example when
Congress does not act to protect some resource or object that is
threatened with irreversible harm, a President may hesitate to act out of
concern about public anger, “just as he hesitates before exercising his
acknowledged right to veto a piece of legislation.”309 Thus, the
possibility of public anger and/or “political repercussions” operates as “a
plausible mechanism for assuring that self-help stays within tolerable
bounds.”310 But under the Antiquities Act, Congress has specifically
authorized the President to take unitary action to protect threatened
resources. So no hesitation is warranted as no boundary between the two
things may be done, but may not be talked about. Making things explicit may be a
separate violation.”).
305
Id. at 1960 n.61 (quoting Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation
of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1748-49 (2016); see also Cary
Coglianese & Kirstin Firth, Separation of Powers Legitimacy: An empirical Inquiry
into Norms About Executive Power, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1909 (2016) (“With
the addition of our research findings, judges and scholars now have empirical
evidence indicating that, in addition to traditional legal and interpretive issues,
something else appears to be at stake in the debate over norms of executive power:
public perceptions of the legitimacy of law.”).
306
Coglianese & Firth, supra note 305, at 1900 (“Furthermore, individuals are
discriminating when it comes to allocating credit and blame. They are generally
more willing to assign blame to the President when there are poor outcomes than
they are to give him credit when things go well.”).
307
Id. (“Our decision to focus on less contentious issues is reinforced by other
empirical research demonstrating that politicization of legal actors and institutions
significantly weakens public legitimacy in these institutions.”).
308
Political motivations might be attributed to President Clinton’s last minute
decision to designate Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument timed to help
with Vice President Gore’s presidential election campaign. See Lin, supra note 17,
at 736-37 (commenting on the timing of President Clinton’s national monument
proclamations).
309
Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care
Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1748-49 (2016).
310
Id.
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branches has been transgressed; nor would public anger, like that
currently directed at President Obama’s designation of Bears Ears
National Monument, be justified. On the other hand, should a sitting
President act to revoke or change a prior President’s designation without
the legal authority to do that, the public might perceive this as flouting
the law and be angry.311
Congress is the best prevention against a President’s abuse of the
their power under the Antiquities Act to designate a national monument.
Congress, at any time, can overturn a presidential designation of a
national monument, change its boundaries, or amend the management
provisions set out in the designation proclamation.312 Indeed, Congress
can repeal the Antiquities Act or restrict the exercise of presidential
discretion under it.313 “In the end, ‘[c]ongressional correction remains
the most potent check on excesses under the Antiquities Act.’”314 Yet,
Congress has rarely seen fit to do this, implying some acquiescence in
how its law is being implemented.315
311

See e.g. Scott Streater, Voters want Trump to protect land, keep monuments, E &
E NEWS 1 (June 28, 2017),
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060056738/print (reporting on a
Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership commissioned poll that found 83%
of the respondents supported keeping both the number and size of existing national
monuments created by Presidents over the past 30 years); see also Letter from
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, State of New Mexico, to Secretary Ryan
Zinke (May 18, 2017) (copy in possession of the author) (writing in opposition to
“any attempt to undo or diminish National Monuments in New Mexico,” reminding
the Secretary that limitations in the Antiquities Act of undoing prior designations
“remain the law of the land,” and stating that he fully expected the Secretary’s
review and recommendations to “stay within the bounds of the law.”); Letter from
Bob Ferguson, Attorney General of Washington to Secretary Ryan Zinke (May 11,
2017) (copy in possession of author) (threatening litigation if President Trump
“seeks to do harm to Washington’s National Monuments by eliminating or
reducing them”).
312
Iraola, supra note 3, at 188-89.
313
Id. Iraola speculates that Congress may need a supermajority to do this. Id. at
189 n.139.
314
David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive
to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279, 306 (1982).
315
Lin, supra note 17, at 729 (saying that the times Congress has done this shows
that “these checks and balances are actual and not merely theoretical.”); see also
Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 5 n.16 (“Congress has abolished a number of
National Monuments by legislation. See, e.g., Wheeler National Monument in 1950
(64 Stat. 405); Shoshone Cavern in 1954 (68 Stat. 98); Papago Saguaro in 1930 (46
Stat. 142); Old Kasaan in 1955 (69 Stat. 380); Fossil Cyad in 1956 (70 Stat. 898);
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C. The President Lacks Implied Power to Revoke or Modify a Previously
Designated National Monument
Since statutory text does not directly support presidential revocation
or modification of a prior monument designation and canons offer no
interpretive gloss that can change unambiguous text, a question remains
whether that power can be implied from the language of the Act or from
an inherent power the President has over the nation’s public lands.316
The answer to that question is also no.
Although Presidents reduced or eliminated Indian reservations
unilaterally by executive order until Congress acted to prohibit those
actions,317 “the executive power to create the reservation had also been
implied . . . from long congressional silence and acquiescence to prior
executive order Indian reservations.”318 The President’s power to create
a national monument is textually supported in the Antiquities Act and
not a matter of implication. It would seem logical, “therefore, that a
court would be much more reluctant to find implied authority to revoke
a proclamation issued pursuant to a specific congressional directive,” as
opposed to an implied authorization to do so when the initial grant of
power was implied as well.319
Further, several laws enacted in the same era as the Antiquities Act
authorizing the President to withdraw public lands also specifically
delegated to the Present or the Secretary of the Interior Department the

Castle Pinkney in 1956 (70 Stat 61); Father Millet Cross in 1949 (63 Stat. 691);
Holy Cross in 1950 (64 Stat. 404); Verendrye in 1956 (70 Stat. 730), and Santa
Rosa Island in 1946 (60 Stat. 712).”
316
Rasband, supra note 191, at 625 (“Because there is no express delegation, a
president would need to prove that a power to revoke can be implied from the
language of the act or can be derived from some inherent executive authority over
the public lands.”); Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 6 (“For the President to have
the power to revoke a Monument designation under the Antiquities Act, therefore,
the issue is whether that Act, not the Constitution’s grant of the executive power to
the President, may be interpreted to imply the unstated power to revoke a
Monument designation thereunder.”). Rasband adds “[i]ndeed, if a court were to
read into the Antiquities Act presidential power to revoke a proclamation, it might
prove a pyrrhic victory for those who support revocation because it would suggest
that the president has some inherent power to withdraw public lands in the future.”
Rasband, supra note 191, at 627.
317
Id. at 625.
318
Id. at 625-26.
319
Id. at 626.
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power to revoke a prior withdrawal.320 These provisions would have
been “surplusage” in those laws had Congress understood that the power
to revoke a withdrawal could be implied from the authority to make a
withdrawal or was an inherent power of the President.321
The Attorney General of the United States, in an oft-cited 1938
opinion, characterized as “improper” implying a presidential power to
revoke or amend a prior designation of a national monument from the
text of the Antiquities Act.322 In response to a request by President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to rescind a national monument designation
by President Coolidge, Attorney General Cummings wrote:
A duty properly performed by the Executive under statutory authority
has the validity and sanctity which belong to the statute itself, and,
unless it be within the terms of the power conferred by that statute, the
Executive can no more destroy his own authorized work, without some
other legislative sanction, than any other person can. To assert such a
principle is to claim for the Executive the power to repeal or alter an
act of Congress at will.323

The Cummings Opinion commented that since there was no separate
statutory authority for the President to terminate a monument that a prior
President had designated, any authority to do this must be implied by the
other powers given the President in the Antiquities Act. Attorney
General Cummings reasoned that since the President had no inherent
authority over public lands, when he did anything affecting those lands,
he was acting only with delegated authority from Congress. This made
the designation of a monument equivalent to an act of Congress, leaving
320

Id. (citing the Pickett Act, 36 Stat. 847 (1901) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 141)
(repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-569, § 704(a) (1976)), (“giving Presidents authority to
“temporarily withdraw public lands”).
321
Rasband, supra note 191, at 627. Similarly, if Congress has delegated the
authority to excise or suspend some provision of a law, it “would be conceptually
redundant if that authority already existed under the aegis of ‘inherent’ executive
power.” Andrew Dudley, Open Borders: Congressional Delegation of
Discretionary Authority to Suspend or Repeal the Laws of the United States. 41
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 273, 281, 284 (2009).
322
Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 1.
323
39 Op. Atty Gen. 185, 185 (1938) (the Cummings Opinion); see also Arnold &
Porter, supra note 12, at 5 (quoting Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney Nat’l
Monument, 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 185, 185 (1938), citing Opinion by Attorney General
Edward Bates to the Secretary of the Interior, 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 359 (1862)) (in
possession of author).
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the President without independent power to rescind a previously
designated monument.324 The opinion cited prior Attorney General
Opinions in support.325
The fact that Presidents have occasionally changed or revoked
executive orders implementing some public land action could militate in
favor of granting the President the power to modify a previously
designated national monument.326 However, the same reasoning that
argues against allowing a President to revoke a previously designated
national monument applies when the President tries to modify that
earlier designation–namely, that when “a President issues a
proclamation on matters either within the President’s inherent powers or
delegated authority, the proclamation has the force of law,”327 as the
Cummings Opinion states.
Rasband disagrees and finds that presidential modifications that
reduce a previously designated monument’s size to conform to the
management needs of the protected objects should be allowable. He
cites in support Attorney General Cumming’s 1938 Opinion that
identifies this as an open question.328 He also relies on a 1947
Department of Interior Decision stating that language in the Antiquities
Act that a monument’s size be limited to “the smallest area compatible
with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected”
may authorize such action.329 Rasband points to the separation in the Act
of the President’s power to designate structures from the power to
reserve lands necessary to protect them, opining that courts might use
that separation to justify allowing the President to shrink the size of a
324

BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 1 n.10; see also Squillace, supra note 25, at 522
(commenting on President Hoover’s Attorney General’s Opinion saying that
transferring jurisdiction over national monuments to the NPS from the Departments
of War and Agriculture was beyond the President’s authority because “Congress
intended that jurisdiction to administer the national monuments which the President
was . . . authorized to create should reside in the Departments which had
jurisdiction respectively of the land within which the monuments were located,”
and explaining that opinion as indicative of the President’s limited delegation under
the Antiquities Act, which did not allow him to transfer jurisdiction over federal
lands).
325
BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 1 (noting that the Cummings Opinion cited with
approval 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 359, 364 (1862) (an opinion cited with approval in 17
Op. Atty. Gen. 168 (1881) and 36 Op. Atty. Gen. 75, 79 (1929)).
326
BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 1.
327
Id.
328
Rasband, supra note 191, at 627.
329
Id.
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monument that is considered inconsistent with that language.330
Asserting that since the only support for large withdrawals from
President Teddy Roosevelt to the present is “congressional
acquiescence,” Rasband reasons that shrinking the size of a previously
designated monument “would thus be akin to modifying a withdrawal
based on implied executive authority rather than on a specific act of
Congress.”331 But, Rasband cites no support for implied executive
authority. While Squillace concedes that a proclamation might need to
be modified “to correct a mistake or clarify a legal description in the
original proclamation,”332 FLPMA, enacted thirty-eight years after the
Cummings Opinion, “cements” the prohibition against a President
“revisit[ing] a predecessor’s decision about how much public land
should be protected,”333 eliminating any textual ambiguity on the
question.
Congress, in essence, adopted the conclusion of Attorney General
Cummings’ Opinion that only Congress had the authority to revoke the
designation of a National Monument in section 204(j) when it enacted
FLPMA in 1976,334 giving it the force of law.335 When it enacted section
207(j) of FLPMA forbidding a President from modifying a prior
designation, Congress eliminated any ambiguity in the Cummings
Opinion over whether the President could shrink or otherwise change the
boundaries of a designated monument to conform to the statutory
mandate that only the “smallest acreage” be reserved to properly manage
and protect designated objects.336
Thus, there is no basis in the text of the Antiquities Act for granting
President Trump the direct or implied power to rescind or modify the
boundaries of the Bears Ears National Monument. No statutory canons
or other interpretive guidance can contradict that text or the later action
by Congress and prior administrations reifying it.
V. GRANTING THE PRESIDENT THE AUTHORITY TO AFFECT A PREVIOUSLY
330

Id. at 627-28.
Id. at 628.
332
Squillace et al., supra note 5, at 69 (citing the issuance of two proclamations by
President Taft to clarify an ambiguous initial description of the Navajo Mountain
National Monument in the initial proclamation).
333
Id.
334
Arnold & Porter, supra note 12, at 1.
335
Id. at 6.
336
BALDWIN, supra note 22, at 1 (noting that Presidents have done this).
331

CONVERTDOC.INPUT.593072.DSQ9K (DO NOT DELETE)

166

STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

1/17/2018 10:44 PM

[Vol. 37:1

DESIGNATED NATIONAL MONUMENT VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS DOCTRINE AND WELL-ESTABLISHED NORMS OF DELEGATED
POWER
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped
with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty than that on
which the objection is founded. The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the
accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a
dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments
would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system.337

By assuming a power that only Congress has, a President who
revokes or amends a prior designation of a national monument violates
the separation of powers doctrine. Unless a power is specifically
delegated to a President or can be implied from the Act’s text or the
President’s general powers, a President cannot usurp a congressional
prerogative. The prior Part showed the President has no such power
either by direct or implied congressional delegation.
Nor can the President waive statutory text that would otherwise
apply to him because he finds it limiting or inconvenient. The
President’s constitutional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed prevent him from ignoring unambiguous language in the
Antiquities Act limiting his authority to the identification and protection
of national monuments.
A. Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine
The doctrine of separation of powers is not explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution.338 The concept does not “have the status of an
enforceable legal norm,” nor is it “a freestanding principle” that can be
implied from the Constitution’s overall structure.339 However,
“separation of powers, like democracy and the rule of law, may be an
indispensable part of our theory of politics (in America) or our
American constitutionalism, even if it is not, in the legalistic sense, a

337

THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 313 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Vermeule, supra note 85, at 688.
339
Id.
338
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freestanding principle of our Constitution.”340
Presidents must “respect the constitutional functions of the other
branches of government. . . .[and] must not impermissibly infringe upon
the Supreme Court’s judicial power or Congress’s legislative power.”341
They display “constitutional arrogance” when they use their “unilateral
powers to break boundaries and displace other constitutional
authorities.”342 Gerhardt points to what he calls the “inherent tendency”
of Presidents to “aggrandize” their power making the Executive Branch
the one “most prone to ‘constitutional arrogance.’”343 Any new claim of
executive power “lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of
any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need.”344 Claims that President Obama’s designation of the Bears Ears
National Monument will cause economic hardship, trampled on the
constitutional rights of Utah, and represents an abuse of executive
authority have the ring of an urgent need for action–here revocation of
that designation. However, as prior parts of this article have shown, none
of these claims is valid and so no urgency exists.
Underlying the concept of separation of powers is respect for “the
character and distinctiveness of each of the three main functions of
government”345—legislative, executive, and judicial. “[F]unctionally
separated decisionmaking” has “intrinsic or inherent value from the
standpoint of political morality.” 346 The result is that the separation of
powers doctrine has risen to a “canonical” level in our “tradition of
340

Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice, 54 B.C. L.
REV. 433, 436 (2013); see also id. at 435 (“[W]hatever it says in the constitution,
does the best interpretation of the constitution's provisions require us to embrace
this as a background legal principle”); Vermeule, supra note 85, at 688 (“But
Waldron rightly observes that even if the separation of powers lacks legal force, it
may still have force as a principle of our constitutional culture—a political ideal in
the high constitutional sense.”).
341
Johnsen, supra note 293, at 413.
342
Coglianese & Yoo, supra note 162, at 1601 n.57 (quoting Michael J. Gerhardt,
Constitutional Arrogance, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2016)).
343
Id. at 1651.
344
Johnsen, supra note 293, at 397-98 n.11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J. dissenting)).
345
Vermeule, supra note 85, at 688; see also id. at 688-89 (“Rather than collapse
all official decisionmaking into an undifferentiated mass, as in the dictates of a
khadi or monarch, it is desirable that there should be ‘articulated government
through successive phases of governance each of which maintains its own
integrity.’”).
346
Id. at 689.
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political thought.”347 Although the Court has not constructed “rigid
barriers” separating the three branches of government, it has “sought to
guard against direct acts of ‘encroachment or aggrandizement’ that
would shift the balance of power between the branches and thereby
weaken structural checks among them.’”348 By proposing to exercise a
power that Congress reserved to itself the power to rescind or modify a
monument designation, the President will impermissibly “encroach” on
the powers of the Legislative Branch and thus violate the separation of
powers doctrine.
B. Abuse of the Norms Governing Delegated Power
The basis for Congress’ authority to enact the Antiquities Act
resides in the Property Clause of the Constitution authorizing Congress
“to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”349 A
President who designates a national monument under the Antiquities Act
is acting pursuant to congressionally delegated powers; “he is not
exercising authority vested in the executive branch.”350 Accordingly,
whether a President may revoke or change a prior designation depends
on whether Congress intended the President to have that power.
However, as discussed previously, the Act does not delegate to the
President the direct or implied power to do this.
On its face, the Antiquities Act does not appear to be a two-way
delegation. It expressly delegates to the president authority to ‘declare’
a national monument and to ‘reserve’ the land necessary to care for
and manage that monument, but says nothing about a president’s
authority to revoke an existing monument.351

The Take Care Clause of the Constitution352 and Article II, Section
347

Waldron, supra note 340, at 437.
Dudley, supra note 321, at 281, 290.
349
U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
350
Rasband, supra note 191, at 625.
351
Id.; see also Arnold & Porter, supra note 12 (referring to national monuments
which have been brought into the National Park system and saying, “[r]evoking the
designation of such a National Monument and pulling it out of the National Park
system would certainly be in derogation of the reasons such special places were
added to that system.”).
352
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
348
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1, together with Section 2, Clause 8353 requires the President to assure
the faithful execution of the laws of the United States. 354 The Antiquities
Act is a law of the United States. The “Court has treated the Take Care
Clause as the direct constitutional source of the President’s obligation to
respect legislative supremacy”355 and as “the textual source of the
President’s duty to abide by and enforce the laws enacted by Congressthat is, as the instantiation of the President’s duty to respect legislative
supremacy and not to act contra legem.”356 Despite “the inherently
imprecise nature of the Take Care Clause obligation,”357 the Court has
interpreted the Clause as though it had “firm and definite content,”
including the maxim of legislative supremacy.358
Suspending or repealing a provision of a statute is “legislative in
character.”359 A President simply does not possess inherent discretionary
353

U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 8
Johnsen, supra note 293, at 408 (“The President's constitutionally prescribed
oath of office, the Take Care Clause, and the Supremacy Clause confirm the
President's obligation to uphold the Constitution through all executive action.”); see
also Coglianese & Yoo, supra note 162, at 1599 (“Bellia notes that the Take Care
Clause cuts both ways in terms of discretion, recognizing that Presidents possess
discretion in how the law is enforced, while simultaneously obligating them to
execute the law in a faithful manner.”).
355
Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 295, at 1837. While Coglianese and Yoo
found it “not very surprising” that the Court agreed to review a lower court’s
injunction blocking implementation of the Obama Administration's immigration
policy, they found it “telling that the Court, on its own accord, added to the
questions raised by the parties a constitutional question involving the duty of a
President to take care that federal laws are faithfully executed.” Coglianese & Yoo,
supra note 162, at 1591 (referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906, 906 (2016), and saying that “the Take Care Clause has
been like the Court's own Key Number for freestanding separation-of-powers
principles.”).
356
Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 295, at 1849; see also id. at 1851 (“[T]he
Court has read the Take Care Clause to limit the President's authority to act contra
legem”); id. at 1850 (“Justice Jackson wrote that the clause confers on the President
‘a governmental authority that reaches so far as there is law,’ thereby
‘signify[ing] . . . that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we submit
ourselves to rulers only if under rules.”).
357
Id. at 1866.
358
Id. at 1867 (“The Take Care Clause underwrites the President's removal power,
draws a line between judicial and executive power, offers a source for the
President's exercise of prosecutorial discretion, establishes legislative supremacy,
and gives the President a measure of completion power.”).
359
Dudley, supra note 321, at 278.
354
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authority to excise the laws of the United States, even though Presidents
possess prosecutorial discretion, have inherent foreign policy powers,
and can proceed without congressional approval in certain situations.360
It is a “simple intuition that once Congress has legislated with
specificity, it has made its policy preference clear and demonstrated its
capacity to make policy in that area.”361 If the President was allowed to
waive the language in FLPMA preventing him from affecting in any
way a designation of a national monument by a prior President, he
would be “dispensing with” a duly enacted law of Congress. 362 This
means that the President cannot view a decision to rescind or modify a
prior designation of a national monument like an “administrative
waiver” of language in FLPMA that specifically prevents him from
doing this or language in the Antiquities Act that only gives him limited
authority to identify and protect historic structures and objects of
scientific interest.
According to Goldsmith and Manning, “any authority conferred by
the Take Care Clause ‘starts and ends with the laws Congress has
enacted.’”363 The Court considers that the Clause deprives the President
of any power to create exceptions or exemptions from a legislative
directive—what Goldsmith and Manning call “dispensation powers.364 It
is rare that a presidential refusal to enforce a statute is justifiable;365
indeed Johnsen suggests that such an action by a President would be
“highly suspect.”366
Allowing a President to waive a statutory obligation is comparable
to the President refusing to enforce the law. For this reason, Presidents
360

Id. at 281, 284.
David J. Barron & Todd Rukoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
265, 317 (2013); see also id. at 333 (“[I]t makes sense presumptively to view the
congressionally stipulated rule as primary, which is to say, as governing unless the
waiver can be shown to be superior. Moreover, according this presumption creates
a positive dynamic of accountability when fed back into the legislative
process . . .”).
362
Id. at 340.
363
Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 295, at 1850 (quoting Justice Douglas,
concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 633
(1952)).
364
Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 295, at 1850.
365
Johnsen, supra note 293, at 411 (“To identify those rare cases in which
nonenforcement is justified requires ‘the President to make sometimes difficult
evaluations that depend on the specific statutory provision and the circumstances
surrounding its enactment.’”).
366
Id. at 413.
361
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cannot waive a statutory requirement unless they have explicit authority
to do that.367 There is no authority in FLPMA section 204(j) to waive
section 213 of the Antiquities Act—in fact, quite the opposite, the
provision enjoins doing this. Thus, allowing a President to rescind the
designation of a monument by a prior President would only be possible
if the President ignored language in section 204(j) of FLPMA
prohibiting him from doing this. Such an action would amount to a
“veto” of section 204 and would “obliterate”368 the designation process
in the Antiquities Act by making something that is intended to be
permanent, a national monument, impermanent.
Nor can a change in Administration or in “political complexion”
serve as a justification for waiving a statutory requirement.369
Justification of a waiver of a statute’s substantive provisions, what
Barron and Rukoff refer to as “big waivers, may be justifiable if the
waiver carries forward what might “reasonably be thought to be one or
more purposes of the statute”370 or at least the purpose of the provision
being waived.371 Except for reconfiguring the boundaries of a monument
Barron & Rukoff, supra note 361, at 312; see also id. at 335 (“To begin, to
waive any, or at least major, substantive statutory provisions, there has to be
explicit statutory authority. And the scope of the waiver authority should be
specific-specific, at least, relative to the statute itself.”).
368
Id. at 312-13. Barron and Rukoff use the terms “administrative veto” and
“obliterate in their discussion of “big waivers,” statutorily authorized waivers of a
law’s provisions that amount to an “administrative veto” of the heart of that
statutory framework, “provisions that seem most central to its effective operation as
a regulatory mechanism.” They distinguish big waivers from the power to
“modify” or “tinker” with a law by excising certain requirements in the law in
response to a situation the law did not contemplate. Id. at 277. If President Trump
proceeded to de-designate Bears Ears that would amount to a big waiver of sections
213 of the Antiquities Act and 204(j) of FLPMA and would be way beyond
“tinkering” with those provisions.
369
Id. at 331 (“It is not a sufficient justification for the exercise of big waiver that
the administration has a different political complexion from Congress or that a new
administration with different political views has been elected. Even in the rule-forrule substitution case, the proposition that a new administration, for that reason
alone, is justified in changing the rules has never had more than fitful support in the
Supreme Court.”); see also id. at 232 (“The assumption that the initial conditions
Congress established were intended to be stickier than a mere agency rule seems
appropriate.”).
370
Id. at 332.
371
Id. at 335 (“[S]tatute should provide, or, if silent, should be understood to
provide, for big waiver only insofar as it is in furtherance of the same basic
purposes as the substantive statutory provisions to be waived. If the waiver
367
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to conform to preservation needs or to correct some error in the
designation, it is difficult to point to any other modification let alone
rescission of a prior monument designation that would be considered as
carrying forward the Antiquities Act’s purposes. It would also be
difficult for President Trump to show that a change in circumstances,
other than a change in Administration, since Bears Ears was originally
designated six months ago, justifies its rescission or modification given
that the factor’s justifying the monument’s designation should still be in
existence if the area has been properly preserved.372
Further, a President has no discretion whether to implement a law
which “assigns specific duties” to him.373 Conformance with a nondiscretionary legal requirement, here the process for designating a
national monument, “is a ministerial duty of the Executive Branch.”374
Allowing a President to suspend or repeal enacted laws, be it section 431
of the Antiquities Act or section 207(j) of FLPMA, enables that
President “to eliminate popularly-passed laws outside the delegating
statute without the operation of an authorized legislative process.”375
The fact that a President can act in derogation of a law more quickly
than Congress can correct or amend it “poses an additional threat to the
social contract,” by curtailing the time the public or its elected
representatives have “to identify and to correct the wrongful actions of a
rogue agent”—here the President—“as well as reducing the time
available for fact-finding, deliberation, and debate.”376
Among problems with allowing Presidents to amend or suspend
existing laws is that Congress might have considered the suspended
provision to be consistent with the statute’s objectives or might be a
provision that Congress would preserve, if given a choice.377 Giving
Presidents the power “to suspend or repeal laws passed by previous

authority is meant to serve some additional or different purpose, it should explicitly
so state.”).
372
Barron & Rukoff, supra note 361, at 332 (“It may be helpful in understanding
what the agency is doing for it to show how the world differs from the world that
existed, or was imagined, at the enactment of the statute.”).
373
Dudley, supra note 321, at 284-85.
374
Id.; see also id. at 285 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 141, 166 (1803)
(“Conformance with the law itself, however, is not within the inherent discretion of
the Executive Branch.”)).
375
Id. at 289
376
Id.
377
Id. at 291-92.
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Congresses”378 also creates an indirect separation of powers problem.
This problem arises “because it would enable a hypothetical political
majority in control of both Congress and the Presidency to disassemble
the enactments of previous governments with exceptional haste, thereby
removing an intrinsic ‘temporal’ check imposed by the plodding Article
I process.’”379 At the time of writing this article, this situation is not
“hypothetical.”
According to Peter Straus, “the question here is how we should
prefer the President to imagine his role in a rule-of-law culture—not
what he can get away with, not what the sanctions are, but what it is that
his role under the Constitution, well-imagined, calls on him to do.”380
The President’s obligation under the Take Care Clause is “an expression
of the President’s unique authority in the allocated functions of
government.”381 The “root proposition,” again according to Straus, “is
that the President does, of necessity, have room for his own provisional
judgments about what the Constitution means, and the power to act on
those judgments.”382 However, “[w]hen the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power
is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”383
Such a “[p]residential claim to a power at once so conclusive and
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”384

378

Id.
Id. at 281, 291-92.
380
Peter Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 107, 110 (2000).
381
Id. at 112.
382
Id. at 117.
383
Id.
384
Id. at 118 (quoting Justice Jackson, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 535-38 (1952); see also Strauss, supra note 380, at 112 (“Congress
has, on occasion, made such decisions reviewable.” A painful footnote to Heckler
v. Chaney hints that there might be limits to judicial reluctance to review, leaving
open for future decision the “situation where it could justifiably be found that the
agency has ‘consciously and expressly adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme
as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”).
379
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VI. CONCLUSION
“Even drops of water falling upon a rock in long lapse of time hollow
out that rock.”385

This article has shown that there is no support in the text of the
Antiquities Act or its legislative or implementation history or in judicial
opinions for presidential rescission or modification of previously
designated national monuments. Enactment of section 204(j) in 1976
affirmed that this power belongs only to Congress. Well-understood
principles of separation of powers counsel against allowing Presidents to
assume this authority; while, norms of delegated authority warn against
allowing Presidents to waive provisions of laws they do not like or
disagree with, as this would contradict their constitutional duty to assure
that the laws are faithfully executed.
Preferences in states like Utah are changing as employment shifts
from traditional occupations, like ranching, to recreation and tourism.
Operating under the shadow of a possible de-designation of a national
monument may destabilize these transitioning local economies, which
have adjusted positively to their presence. Granting the President this
power will also create uncertainty with respect to the permanence of
these monuments, affecting their long term management, and undercut
the Act’s purposes by lessening the likelihood that any new monuments
will be designated.
All these reasons militate against assuming the President has this
power, making any use of it vulnerable to judicial challenge and
potential political backlash, if the President is perceived to be behaving
illegitimately. Questions about the legitimacy of the President’s actions
can destabilize the Republic to the extent it disrupts the “equilibrium” of
our constitutional system. Thus, what at first glance appears to be an
inconsequential act-- the revocation of President Obama’s designation of
Bears Ears National Monument—upon further reflection gains grave
importance.

385

LUCRETIUS, DE RERUM NATURA, 134 (Martin Ferguson Smith, trans., Hackett
Publishing Company 1969) (1st century, B.C.).

